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Searching for Federal Judicial Power:
Article III and the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court
Peter Margulies*
ABSTRACT
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC") has an Article III
problem. Under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 Amendments Act of 2008 ("FAA"), which brought the Bush administra-
tion's Terrorist Surveillance Program under the rule of law, the FISC typically
proceeds ex parte, hearing only from one party: the government. FISC pro-
ceedings under section 702 therefore lack the benefit of adverse parties clarify-
ing the issues, which the Supreme Court has linked with sound adjudication
and judicial self-governance.
The FISC's section 702 role does not fit neatly into the established catego-
ries of cases, such as search warrants, where ex parte proceedings are permissi-
ble. The broad surveillance practices that the FISC reviews under section 702
lack the individualized facts of warrant requests or a direct link to criminal
prosecutions. Under Article III of the United States Constitution, the FISC's
section 702 role may be neither fish nor fowl.
Closer examination reveals that although the FISC's role under section
702 is novel, it fits within Article IIl's space for the exercise of judgment by
independent courts. This Article makes that case via the congruency test,
which the Supreme Court invoked in Morrison v. Olson to uphold a statute
requiring judicial appointment of an independent counsel to investigate allega-
tions of executive misconduct in the wake of the Watergate scandal. Building
on Morrison, it argues that the test for compliance of statutes with Article III
must be pragmatic, affording Congress a measure of flexibility. Two Article
III cases from October Term 2015-Bank Markazi v. Peterson and Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins-demonstrate that Congress is entitled to deference when it
seeks to promote operational values such as speed and accuracy in dynamic
domains such as national security, foreign relations, and emergent technology.
The importance of timely responses to cyber threats fits the FAA within that
rubric.
The FISC's section 702 role also serves important structural values, by
deterring executive branch surveillance abuses. Moreover, in the USA FREE-
DOM Act, passed after Edward Snowden's disclosures about National Secur-
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law; B.A., Colgate University,
1978; J.D., Columbia Law School, 1981. I served as co-counsel for amici curiae in a case dis-
cussed in this Article. See Brief of Current U.S. Senators Sheldon Whitehouse, Lindsey 0. Gra-
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ity Agency surveillance, Congress established a panel of amici curiae to assist
the FISC. Robust arguments by amici curiae, possibly augmented by a public
advocate opposing government surveillance requests, can replicate most of the
virtues of adversarial combat. Combining the virtues of adversarial argument
with the operational and structural benefits of the FAA demonstrates the stat-
ute's congruence with the history and practice of federal courts.
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INTRODUCTION
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC") has an un-
easy relationship with Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Under sec-
tion 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
Amendments Act of 2008 ("FISA Amendments Act" or "FAA"),1 the
FISC at first blush appears to be neither fish nor fowl. Article III's
tenure and salary protections safeguard the independence of FISC
judges, who typically conduct ex parte proceedings in which the gov-
1 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA),
Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 702, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a
(2012)).
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ernment is the only party to the litigation. The absence of adverse
parties raises a red flag under Article 111.2 While federal courts rou-
tinely proceed ex parte on matters such as requests for search war-
rants, under the FAA the FISC adjudicates broad legal questions.
Those questions lack the individualized facts and links to criminal
prosecutions of warrant requests. 3 This apparent ill fit spurs fears that
Congress, in enacting the FAA, has commandeered the federal courts
to serve purposes unsuited to the exercise of judicial power. Despite
these concerns, courts and scholars have devoted more attention to
whether the warrantless surveillance authorized by the FAA violates
the Fourth Amendment than they have conferred on the interaction
of Article III and the FISC.4 This Article aims to both redress the
balance and provide the FISC with a coherent Article III justification.
2 See United States v. Muhtorov, 187 F. Supp. 3d 1240, 1250-53 (D. Colo. 2015) (order
denying motion to suppress evidence obtained or derived under FAA or for discovery; discuss-
ing Article III questions raised by FAA but declining to strike down statute); Walter F. Mondale
et al., No Longer a Neutral Magistrate: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in the Wake of
the War on Terror, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2251, 2298-2301 (2016) (arguing that the FISC violates
Article III); Nadine Strossen, Beyond the Fourth Amendment: Additional Constitutional Guaran-
tees that Mass Surveillance Violates, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 1143, 1166 (2015) (same); see also Orin S.
Kerr, A Rule of Lenity for National Security Surveillance Law, 100 VA. L. REV. 1513, 1539-40
(2014) (suggesting that the FISC does not operate like a "regular court," and is ill-equipped for
both evaluating policy and performing judicial role); Stephen I. Vladeck, The FISA Court and
Article I1, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1161, 1170-80 (2015) (acknowledging that the FISC's role
under section 702 raises Article III issues, but arguing that provisioning for a public advocate
who would oppose government surveillance requests would address adverse parties concern and
therefore ameliorate constitutional difficulties). Other authorities have noted the existence of
potential Article III conflicts, even in finding the issue of limited concern. See In re Sealed Case,
310 F.3d 717, 732 n.19 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (asserting, with respect to other, pre-FAA provi-
sions of the FISA that authorize government to seek a court order permitting surveillance of
suspected agent of a foreign power, that "there is [not] much left" to Article III objections);
James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party Requirement,
and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1353-57, 1362, 1375, 1384, 1386 (2015)
(arguing that history and values underlying Article III support recognition of a category of "non-
contentious jurisdiction," including naturalization, warrant requests, default orders, and reme-
dies such as receivership for business organizations).
3 But cf Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1462-65 (suggesting that the FISC fits within
larger claimed category of "non-contentious jurisdiction" without adverse parties, although not
specifically addressing special features of the FISC's role under section 702).
4 See United States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420, 438-44 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that sec-
tion 702 was consistent with Fourth Amendment of U.S. Constitution); United States v. Has-
bajrami, No. 11-CR-623 (JG), 2016 WL 1029500, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2016) (same); Name
Redacted, at 77 (FISA Ct., Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/20151106-
702MemOpinionOrder forPublicRelease.pdf (same); see also In re Directives [redacted
text] Pursuant to Section 105b of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1015
(FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (holding that the Protect America Act of 2007, a predecessor of the FAA,
was consistent with the Constitution); Mohamud, 843 F.3d at 444 n.28 (finding that role of FISC
did not violate Article III). But see LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLI-
[Vol. 85:800
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The absence of adverse parties at the FISC deprives those pro-
ceedings of a hallmark of Article III's "case or controversy require-
ment." 5 In most litigation, the presence of adverse parties is integral to
the nature of the judicial function. 6 Adverse parties ensure that issues
in a dispute will be sharply delineated, and that the court will decide
concrete disputes that a judicial remedy can resolve. 7 With adverse
parties clarifying the issues, the court will avoid issuing advisory opin-
ions untethered to specific facts. Both the case or controversy formu-
lation and the preference for adverse parties keep the judiciary in its
"lane" and prevent intrusions on the domain of the political branches,
ensuring that federal courts remain the distinctive and independent
check that the Framers envisioned.8
While courts regularly use ex parte proceedings to review warrant
requests in ordinary criminal investigations, the FAA contemplates re-
view that is far broader.9 Pursuant to section 702, the FISC reviews an
annual certification by the Justice Department regarding the collec-
tion and use by the National Security Agency ("NSA") and other
agencies of foreign intelligence information from communications be-
tween a U.S. person 10 and a person reasonably believed to be located
abroad ("one-end foreign" communications).11 In its review, the FISC
GENCE: PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE IN A DIGITAL AGE 68-72 (2016) (arguing that FAA
threatens privacy and clashes with Fourth Amendment).
5 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2685 (2013) (suggesting that a strong prefer-
ence for adverse parties is a key aspect of "judicial self-governance").
6 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975) (cautioning that without requirement
of concrete dispute between adverse parties "the courts would be called upon to decide abstract
questions of wide public significance even though other governmental institutions may be more
competent to address the questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to
protect individual rights").
7 See id. at 500.
8 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 464 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(noting that, in contrast with the political branches, the judiciary has "neither FORCE nor
WILL but merely judgment"); id. at 470 (linking distinctive judicial judgment with courts being
"bound down by strict ... precedents which.., define and point out their duty in every particu-
lar case that comes before them"); see also Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483 (2011) (citing
assertion in THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) that in turn quoted
Montesquieu for proposition that "there is no liberty if the power of judging be not separated
from the legislative and executive powers").
9 See Redacted, 2011 WL 10945618, at *10 (FISA Ct., Oct. 3, 2011); William C. Banks,
Programmatic Surveillance and FISA: Of Needles in Haystacks, 88 TEx. L. REV. 1633, 1645-48
(2010); David R. Shedd et al., Maintaining America's Ability to Collect Foreign Intelligence: The
Section 702 Program, HERITAGE FOUND., May 13, 2016, at 3, http://report.heritage.org/bg3122.
10 A U.S. person, as defined for foreign intelligence collection purposes, is a U.S. citizen or
lawful permanent resident. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i) (2012); Shedd et al., supra note 9, at 2. Similar
protections cover persons physically located within the United States. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b).
11 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g); Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1145 (2013).
2017]
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assesses targeting procedures under section 702. These procedures
regulate the use of selectors such as email addresses and phone num-
bers that are reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence informa-
tion, querying data incidentally collected under section 702, and the
purging ("minimization") of U.S. person information. 12 If the FISC
approves the certification, private firms must provide the government
with access to such communications. 13 The FAA permits challenges by
Internet service providers ("ISPs") and other private firms to govern-
ment directives based on approved certifications.14 However, such
challenges are quite rare.15 In the vast majority of cases, therefore, no
adverse party will appear in the FISC's proceedings.
While courts also use ex parte proceedings for ordinary warrant
requests by law enforcement, the FISC's role under section 702 bears
little resemblance to a court adjudicating standard warrant requests.
Instead of considering specific facts adduced by officials investigating
alleged criminal activity, the FISC has a function that recalls adminis-
trative law: reviewing proposed administrative rules for conformity
with the agency's governing statute.16 However, because FISC pro-
ceedings are so heavily ex parte, the FISC typically lacks input from
persons and entities most affected by the rules it reviews. 17 This lack
of input distinguishes the FISC's process from most administrative law
cases.
18
To present a coherent case for the consistency of the FISC's sec-
tion 702 role with Article III, this Article turns to the congruency test
12 See Shedd et al., supra note 9, at 3-4.
13 See id. at 3.
14 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4).
15 See Vladeck, supra note 2, at 1174.
16 See Samuel J. Rascoff, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 575, 627-28 (2010)
(discussing regulatory conception of FISC's role); Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as
Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039, 1103-08 (2016) (same); see also Christopher
Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102
GEO. L.J. 1721, 1758-60 (2014) (suggesting the courts use administrative law doctrines to cabin
government surveillance). But see DONOHIUE, supra note 4, at 69-72 (arguing that FISC has not
provided robust constraints); Aziz Z. Huq, How the Fourth Amendment and the Separation of
Powers Rise (and Fall) Together, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 139, 161-63 (2016) (same).
17 See generally Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representa-
tion in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEx. L. REv. 441 (2010) (discussing how providing for notice and
comment by regulatory stakeholders echoes the Framers' views about deliberative dialogue).
18 See, e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (holding that the Transportation Security Administration had failed to comply with the
Administrative Procedure Act in not initiating notice and comment procedures prior to imple-
mentation of full-body airport screening).
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that the Supreme Court invoked in Morrison v. Olson.19 In Morrison,
the Court held that Article III did not bar a statute providing for judi-
cial appointment of an independent counsel. 20 Congress enacted the
independent counsel statute to resolve conflicts of interest that be-
came apparent during Watergate, when an official appointed and later
fired by the president had to investigate misconduct by the president
and his senior aides. Similarly, Congress granted the FISC authority to
review collection of one-end foreign communications after disclosure
of President George W. Bush's Terrorist Surveillance Program, which
bypassed the restraints Congress had imposed in the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act ("FISA").21 While Morrison addressed the in-
teraction of Article III and the Appointments Clause, the congruency
test furnishes a useful lens to examine the FISC's section 702 role.
The congruency test asks whether the task that Congress has as-
signed to the federal courts is consistent with the judicial branch's pur-
pose and practice. This inquiry is informed both by Morrison's view of
the independent counsel statute as a reaction to executive branch con-
flicts of interests and the Court's invitation to Congress in United
States v. United States District Court (Keith) 22 to provide for a "spe-
cially designated court" to review national security surveillance re-
quests.23 To refine Morrison's teaching on the deference due
Congress's view of Article III, this Article turns to two Supreme
Court Article III decisions from October Term 2015-Bank Markazi
v. Peterson24 and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins.25 Taken together, Bank
Markazi and Spokeo suggest that Congress should receive a measure
of deference under Article III when it addresses dynamic contexts
such as national security, foreign affairs, or emerging technology. 26 In-
formed by this premise, the Article suggests that the congruency of a
legislatively assigned task with Article III hinges on five factors:
(1) the nexus with operational goals, such as speed, secrecy, and accu-
racy; (2) promotion of structural goals, such as accountability; (3) the
19 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
20 Id. at 679.
21 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified
as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.); see Banks, supra note 9, at 1645-47.
22 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
23 Id. at 323.
24 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1317 (2016) (holding that Article III did not bar Congress from empow-
ering federal courts to designate specific Iranian assets as subject to attachment by victims of
Iran-sponsored terrorist attacks).
25 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (suggesting that Congress has some leeway in defining the
types of intangible harm that confer standing to sue).
26 See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1549-50; Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1328.
20171
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fit between the task and courts' history and practice; (4) the availabil-
ity of alternatives; and, (5) appropriate limits on the legislatively as-
signed role.
Examination of these factors reveals that the FISC's section 702
role meets the congruency standard. Consider operational factors. As
in Bank Markazi, in which the Court upheld a statute designating spe-
cific assets as subject to execution of judgment by victims of Iran-
sponsored terrorism,2 7 the FISC reviews certifications that play out in
the volatile arena of foreign affairs. Indeed, as Spokeo suggests, Con-
gress is also entitled to deference when it balances interests affected
by emergent technologies.2 8 Just as the deluge of online information in
Spokeo triggered a measure of deference to Congress's conferral of
standing on victims of errant credit data aggregators, 29 Congress mer-
its deference for streamlining intelligence collection by rejecting cum-
bersome ex ante judicial review of all foreign targets. 30 This balancing
also has structural ramifications. In enacting section 702, Congress not
only made intelligence collection more effective, it also positioned the
FISC to curb the government's online intrusions on U.S. person
data.31
Moreover, despite the novelty of the FISC's role, the FAA pre-
serves many of the attributes of ordinary federal litigation. Case law
27 See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1317.
28 See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
29 See id. at 1549-50.
30 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143-44 (2013) (noting in dicta of
case holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge FAA, that FAA was enacted after the
President asked Congress to amend the FISA to "provide the intelligence community with addi-
tional authority to meet the challenges of modern technology and international terrorism").
31 See Emily Berman, The Two Faces of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 91
IND. L.J. 1191, 1207-16 (2016) (arguing that the FISC has fulfilled its gatekeeper responsibili-
ties). Some argue that the FISC has not always fulfilled this function. For example, Edward
Snowden's 2013 disclosures about the FISC's authorization of the NSA's collection of U.S.
landline metadata under the USA PATRIOT Act led to wide public debate, and eventually to
enactment of the USA FREEDOM Act, which put metadata collection under the aegis of pri-
vate telecommunications firms. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and
Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring (USA FREEDOM) Act of 2015, Pub. L. No.
114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (codified at various sections of title 50 of the U.S. Code); DONOHUE, supra
note 4, at 45-53 (describing evolution of metadata program); see also ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d
787, 824 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that metadata program exceeded scope of statute). The FISC's
interpretation of the NSA's authority under the PATRIOT Act does not demonstrate that the
FISC's role under the FAA, a different statute, violates Article III. Even assuming its reading of
the PATRIOT Act was incorrect, analysis of the FISC's compliance with Article III transcends
the merits of its decisions on any one issue. However, the metadata episode does affirm Con-
gress's wisdom in the USA FREEDOM Act in appointing a panel of amici curiae to assist the
FISC.
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indicates that possible adverse parties may satisfy Article III stan-
dards.32 Under the FAA, while actual adverse parties are rare, the
statute allows challenges by ISPs that receive directives to transfer
data to the government. 33 Moreover, Congress has established a panel
of amici curiae to oppose the government, even when no actual ad-
verse party is participating in the proceeding.34 The amici supply alter-
native perspectives, although a more institutionalized public advocate
at the FISC would be better still.35
The FAA includes further indicia of fealty to venerable Article
III attributes. The individuals whose privacy interests the FISC pro-
tects would have suffered what looks like an injury in fact, because the
government's intelligence efforts result in the collection of data that
many individuals would like to keep to themselves.36 Moreover, the
FISC under section 702 generates final judgments, as does any other
Article III tribunal.37 FISC rulings on FAA certifications are not mere
recommendations or idle wish lists, to be revisited or ignored based on
executive fiat. Rather, the FISC's decisions have the full force of law.38
32 See Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 576-78 (1926); In re Pac. Ry. Comm'n, 32 F.
241, 255 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887) (Field, J.). But see Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1393-1402
(questioning centrality of possible adverse parties to compliance with Article III, and arguing
instead that Article III permits wide spectrum of non-contentious litigation not requiring either
actual or possible adverse parties).
33 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(A) (2012).
34 See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(i) (2015). Cf United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2687 (2013)
(discussing importance of vigorous amicus curiae participation to holding that Article III and
prudential principles permitted adjudication of challenge to federal Defense of Marriage Act
("DOMA"), which was uncontested by executive branch and thus lacked actual adverse parties).
35 See Peter Margulies, Dynamic Surveillance: Evolving Procedures in Metadata and For-
eign Content Collection After Snowden, 66 HASTINGs L.J. 1, 51-55 (2014) (arguing that public
advocate would aid FISC in achieving deliberative ideal envisioned by Hamilton); Vladeck,
supra note 2, at 1179 (noting that robust public advocate would serve as "meaningful adversary"
to executive branch and thus transform judicial review of FAA issues into litigation that "more
closely resembles" administrative law disputes).
36 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147-50 (assuming collection of content of communications
without individuals' consent would constitute injury in fact, while holding that plaintiffs lacked
standing because they had not demonstrated either that collection had occurred or that any such
collection was due to statute that plaintiffs had challenged).
37 See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 (1792); see also Bank Markazi v. Peterson,
136 S. Ct. at 1310, 1325-26 (holding that Congress did not impermissibly interfere with final
judgment when it designated additional assets as subject to execution or attachment by plaintiffs
who had already obtained tort judgment against Iran for state-sponsored acts of terrorism). But
see id. at 1332 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (dissenting, based not on interference with final judg-
ment, but because of concern that Congress had unduly inserted itself into outcome of specific
dispute).
38 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(1)-(4) (2012) (authorizing the FISC to issue orders subject to
judicial review).
2017]
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In addition, there are few, if any, feasible alternatives to the
FISC's FAA role. Other potential forums for review, such as an exec-
utive agency or an Article I court that lacks the protections furnished
by Article III, do not possess the independence and institutional credi-
bility that an Article III court commands. 39 Congress has also cabined
the FISC's role: the FISC's only section 702 function concerns one-
end foreign communications. 40 The FISC does not adjudicate ordinary
warrant requests in criminal investigations, or second-guess the policy
judgments made by the political branches. Those limits preserve the
distinctive exercise of independent judgment by Article III tribunals
that Hamilton celebrated more than two centuries ago.
This Article is in three Parts. Part I recounts the history of ex
parte proceedings, centering on the use of warrants in criminal investi-
gations and attachments in civil litigation. It links those time-honored
ex parte devices to operational virtues such as speed and secrecy, as
well as structural values such as preserving courts' ability to adjudi-
cate, to hold officials accountable, and to compensate wronged par-
ties. Part II discusses the evolution of FISA, from Congress's 1978
response to the Nixon-era abuses to the 2008 enactment of the FAA
in the wake of the Terrorist Surveillance Program unilaterally initiated
by President George W. Bush. It notes the continuing relevance of
debates that pitted concern with an unduly expansive judicial role 41
against arguments that a federal court could assure the public that
"foreign intelligence collection was being more responsibly adminis-
tered" than it had been by past presidents.42 Part III applies the con-
gruency test, concluding that the FISC's section 702 role fits within the
rubric established by the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson and
harmonizes with the measure of deference supplied by the Court most
recently in Bank Markazi and Spokeo.
39 But see Renan, supra note 16, at 1121-23 (arguing that independent executive agency,
such as augmented Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board ("PCLOB"), could perform re-
viewing function).
40 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(2)(B) (2012).
41 See Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance: Hearings on H.R. 5794, H.R. 9745, H.R.
7308, and H.R. 5632 Before the Subcomm. on Legislation of the H. Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence, 95th Cong. 223 (1978) [hereinafter Subcommittee Hearings] (statement of Hon. Lau-
rence Silberman); see also In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 732 n.19 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (recon-
sidering 1978 views in light of subsequent precedent); Vladeck, supra note 2, at 1167 (discussing
testimony).
42 Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 41, at 228 (testimony of Philip Lacovara, former
counsel to Watergate Special Prosecutors); see also Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 652-53
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that a warrant was required for national security surveillance of do-
mestic organization sharing no "community of interest" with foreign power).
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I. Ex PARTE PROCEEDINGS AS STRUCTURAL AND OPERATIONAL
REMEDIES
Ex parte factfinding regarding warrant requests and ex parte civil
remedies such as attachment developed for overlapping reasons. Both
warrants and attachments served structural, institutional purposes:
without an arrest warrant authorizing a criminal suspect's seizure, the
individual could flee the jurisdiction and frustrate adjudication of his
culpability. Operational reasons, such as the need for speed and
stealth in apprehending the suspect, also shaped warrant requests' ex
parte character. Similar forces drove the development of the remedy
of attachment as a device for ensuring that assets at issue in commer-
cial litigation remained in place pending adjudication of the underly-
ing dispute. 43 Safeguards applied to each curbed abuse by either
rapacious merchants44 or government officials seeking to punish politi-
cal opponents.45 The judicial role in each played out against the back-
drop of concerns that were vital to the Framers: how to structure a
modern government that effectively enforced the law without govern-
ment overreaching.
A. Warrants and Ex Parte Factfinding in English and Early
American History
Challenges to effective and fair law enforcement emerged in
eighteenth-century Britain with increased trade and the growth of
government. Britain's imperial commitments and participation in Eu-
ropean wars spurred demands for more revenue. Officials sought to
generate that revenue through the collection of taxes and tariffs. 46
However, some members of the burgeoning middle class created by
increased trade viewed paying taxes as a lifestyle choice, not a legal
obligation. They exploited Britain's vibrant economy to move taxable
goods, including liquor, one step ahead of the tax collector. To ensure
that taxes were paid, government officials needed a way to move as
43 Compare infra Section I.A (noting that government officials needed to move quickly
and furtively in finding tax dodgers), with infra Section I.B (asserting the need for attachment to
be both quick and secretive to avoid the sale of a disputed asset).
44 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972) (holding that pre-judgement replevin pro-
visions create a deprivation of property without due process of law because there is no opportu-
nity to be heard before the chattels are taken).
45 See Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tri. 1029, 1065-66 (C.P. 1765) (holding that a
warrant for personal papers was not sufficient to overcome a trespassing cause of action).
46 See Joseph J. Thorndike, Taxes, Trade, and the British Taste for Beer, TAX ANALYSTS,
http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/Artweb/07D85FCB7991B95A8525743A075B39B?
OpenDocument (Apr. 22, 2008) (reviewing JOHN V.C. NYE, WAR, WINE, AND TAXES: THE PO-
LITICAL ECONOMY OF ANGLO-FRENCH TRADE, 1689-1900 (2007)).
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quickly and furtively as their scofflaw adversaries. Official remedies
included searches of homes or businesses where tax evaders might be
hiding goods.47 Such remedies enabled officials to secure the taxable
goods and guarantee that the government received its legal due. Offi-
cials also needed a legal imprimatur for their efforts, to avoid suits for
trespass filed by merchants, homeowners, and others contesting
searches. The mechanism favored through the first half of eighteenth
century and beyond was the general warrant.48
Officials requested and received general warrants from English
courts in ex parte proceedings. The ease of obtaining the warrant and
the ex parte nature of the proceeding allowed officials to act swiftly
and secretly to detect crimes such as tax evasion and secure goods
subject to tax before those goods were sold, used, or consumed.
While we can understand officials' legitimate law enforcement in-
terest in ensuring payment of taxes and tariffs, another target of offi-
cial searches in eighteenth-century England was more troubling: free
expression. Home searches there implicated liberties that the English
had come to understand as their birthright.49 Economic and techno-
logical changes, such as the resources made available by commercial
activity and the ease of disseminating information permitted by the
printing press, together with the growth of government and empire,
fueled increased public criticism which officials framed as "seditious
libel."'50 To prove seditious libel, officials needed a swift and secretive
way to locate pamphlets and other printed materials that were critical
of the government before those materials were disseminated to the
general population and those who shared the pamphleteers' critical
perspective. Here, too, the issuance of warrants assisted law enforce-
ment goals.
The initial failure of judges issuing the warrants to constrain law
enforcement led to serious problems. Instead of insisting on a
methodical factual showing and inserting language in the warrant that
47 See ARTHUR H. CASH, JOHN WILKES: THE SCANDALOUS FATHER OF CIVIL LIBERTY 78
(2006); see also LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 153 (1999).
48 See LEVY, supra note 47, at 153 (1999) (noting that all but 2 of the 108 authorized
warrants issued from 1700-1763 were general warrants).
49 Historians view the legal basis for this understanding as more questionable. See LEVY,
supra note 47, at 151 (observing that Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause and prohibition on
unreasonable searches and seizures arose from political discourse in Britain prior to American
revolution that was "the extraordinary coupling of Magna Carta to the appealing fiction that 'a
man's house is his castle' . . . [with] embellishments on the insistence, which was rhetorically
compelling, though historically without foundation, that government cannot encroach on the
private premises of the individual subject" of the Crown).
50 Id. at 159-60.
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limited searches to particular items and locations, English courts regu-
larly approved general warrants that delegated all discretion to gov-
ernment officials.51 In cases of tax and customs violations, the use of
general warrants led to lawless official pilferage from houses and
places of business, adding to the corruption that government critics
lamented. In the seditious libel context, the unfettered official action
underwritten by general warrants served as a means for intimidating
political opponents.52 For these reasons, English judges, echoed by the
Framers and their compatriots who agitated for an American Bill of
Rights, came to view general warrants as "contrary to the fundamen-
tal principles of the constitution. ' 53 To counter the dangers of general
warrants, the drafters of the Fourth Amendment included the Warrant
Clause, which required that a warrant be specific regarding the items
sought and the locations searched.
This Fourth Amendment story has important consequences for
Article III. Under the Warrant Clause, a neutral judicial officer had to
require a more particularized showing from law enforcement. 54 There-
fore, the Fourth Amendment actually increased the judge's ex parte
factfinding role. Particularity does not happen by magic; it requires
more detailed submissions from law enforcement, and of necessity
contemplates a more elaborate dialogue between the judicial officer
and the party seeking a warrant .55 While the supporters of the Fourth
Amendment voted to mandate this heightened ex parte judicial role,
they at no point suggested that this expanded role violated the restric-
tions on federal judicial power in Article 111.56 Rather, the wide sup-
port for the inclusion of the Fourth Amendment suggested that
51 Id. at 154, 156.
52 See Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tri. 1029, 1071-72 (C.P. 1765); Wilkes v. Wood, 19
How. St. Tri. 1153, 1154, 1170 (C.P. 1763); LEvy, supra note 47, at 162 (discussing Entick); see
also Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1195-1207
(2016) (discussing British cases); Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers,
71 VA. L. REV. 869, 880-83 (1985) (unpacking strands of discussion in Entick regarding seizure
of papers); cf Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV.
547, 610-11 (1999) (tracing language of Fourth Amendment to Framers' concern about risk of
reprise of general warrants). The history of the Fourth Amendment is complex and subject to
continuing debate; resolution of those controversies is beyond the scope of this Article.
53 See Wilkes, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1167.
54 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
55 Of course this dialogue may be relatively brief in many cases. However, the judge has
both the power and responsibility to make such findings, and request any and all information
from law enforcement that will assist in that task.
56 Cf United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972) (noting Warrant
Clause's requirement of "prior judicial judgment" on legality of search, without suggestion that
such judgment might violate Article III).
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necessary structural remedies for executive overreaching required a
measure of flexibility in interpreting Article III's constraints.
A warrant, in addition to providing the government with permis-
sion to seize property or monitor communications, also enabled the
government to secure possible evidence of a crime in order to ensure
the efficacy of a prosecution. 57 Moreover, warrants in England in the
eighteenth century authorized the arrest of a suspect, who might oth-
erwise defeat prosecution by fleeing the jurisdiction. A court would
generally adjudicate an arrest warrant ex parte; notice to the party
whose arrest the government sought would only encourage that indi-
vidual's flight. Blackstone, whose commentaries were well known to
the Framers, cited an even earlier English treatise writer, Matthew
Hale, in declaring that "long custom established" that courts had to be
able to issue arrest warrants upon suspicion that the suspect had com-
mitted a crime, prior to an indictment.58 Otherwise, according to
Blackstone, "in most cases.., felons [would] escape without punish-
57 See Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1066 (acknowledging that police or rightful owner could
lawfully engage in "search and seizure for stolen goods"). One can read Entick as categorically
forbidding the seizure of papers from an individual's home, even if officials could show probable
cause that those papers were evidence of a crime. See id. (appearing to suggest that magistrate
could not order seizure of personal papers and that government official who removed papers
from an individual's home would be liable for trespass). However, the better view is that Lord
Camden objected to officials' unfettered discretion to seize personal papers and refuse to return
them. See id. (decrying that owner lacked "power to reclaim his [papers], even after his inno-
cence is cleared by acquittal"). Lord Camden was also clearly disturbed by the chilling effect this
seizure power had on political speech-a freedom that was vulnerable in Britain, given that
country's lack of a written constitution. See generally William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins
of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 402-03 (1995) (discussing context of Entick). Profes-
sor Stuntz also doubted the relevance of disputes about Entick's meaning beyond its rejection of
overly broad warrants. See id. at 403. Stuntz observed that the broad language in Entick con-
demning seizure of papers was irrelevant to prosecutions for ordinary crimes lacking the political
component of the general warrant cases, since Britain during that era had no regular police force
or capacity for investigating criminal conspiracies prior to commission of a criminal act. Id. at
401. In addition, Professor Stuntz observed, British law clearly permitted searches incident to
arrest, including searches of an individual's home when an arrest took place there. See id. at
403-04. The U.S. Supreme Court at one point adopted an absolutist approach to papers, barring
their seizure. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886) (relying on Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination); see also Donald A. Dripps, "Dearest Property": Digital
Evidence and the History of Private "Papers" as Special Objects of Search and Seizure, 103 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 83-106 (2013) (discussing Boyd's rationale and context, while
conceding that its absolutist approach unduly hampers law enforcement). However, the Court
routinely upheld administrative subpoenas for the production of papers, see Interstate Com-
merce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 476-77 (1894), and overruled Boyd decades ago, see
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610 n.8, 611-12 (1984) (holding that required production of
documents did not violate Fifth Amendment).
58 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *287.
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ment. ' '59 Similarly, in Entick v. Carrington,60 the groundbreaking En-
glish case outlawing the use of expansive warrants to harass political
opponents, Lord Camden implied that a warrant to seize an individ-
ual's personal papers as evidence of a crime had to be particular about
the nature of the evidence sought and its link with the crime alleged.61
The flipside of the court's observation was that the government might
be able to make out an ex parte showing sufficient to obtain a warrant
for a suspect's personal effects or other goods in his possession if the
alleged crime at issue was covert in nature, such as a robbery or bur-
glary, and the suspect would be able to dispose of all traces of his or
her crime absent government action. 62
For similar reasons, American courts often allowed warrantless
arrests. As an early nineteenth century American case put it, a war-
rantless arrest would be valid when a law enforcement officer saw the
suspect commit a crime, such as murder or robbery, since the suspect,
if not "arrested on the spot," would escape and continue to "endan-
ger[ ] the safety of society. '63 A warrant thus did not merely indem-
nify law enforcement officers who otherwise might have to face a civil
suit by the subject of the search. Each warrant also embodied a judi-
cial acknowledgment of the importance of preserving evidence and
ensuring that a suspect would be available for prosecution.
B. Ex Parte Proceedings and Civil Remedies
The need for an expeditious remedy that preserved the option of
adjudication also played a role in another ex parte procedure-this
one civil in nature: attachment to secure disputed goods pending reso-
lution of litigation regarding ownership.64 The mundane civil litigation
landscape in which attachment played out may seem far removed
from the charged atmosphere of warrant applications in felony prose-
cutions. However, the two procedures boast subtle similarities: each is
done ex parte for reasons of secrecy and speed. Moreover, each in-
volves facilitating subsequent court proceedings by ensuring that uni-
lateral actions do not frustrate the judicial process. In addition,
59 Id.
60 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C.P. 1765).
61 See id. at 1072.
62 See id. at 1073-74.
63 Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 316, 318 (Pa. 1814). See generally United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411, 418-22 (1976) (discussing common law basis for warrantless arrests).
64 See Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 104 (1921); Nathan Levy, Jr., Attachment, Garnish-
ment, and Garnishment Execution: Some American Problems Considered in the Light of the En-
glish Experience, 5 CoNN. L. REV. 399, 405, 430 (1973).
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specific warrants and modern attachment also deter unilateral at-
tempts at self-help by the party seeking relief.
Attachment was related to economic growth in England, since
the practice evolved as an ancillary remedy in commercial disputes,65
just as the issuance of warrants developed as an ancillary to criminal
investigations. Attachment was done secretly and with dispatch. 66 At-
taching assets at the start of a civil case ensured that a disputed res
would remain intact during the pendency of litigation.67 Because the
initial attachment was ex parte, the party seeking possession of assets
pursuant to a claim of rightful ownership did not provide notice of the
proceeding to the party in possession. 68 Proceeding without notice en-
sured that the party in possession could not "transfer or encumber"
the disputed assets while the litigation was pending. 69 Without this
remedy in place, a party who had possession of contested property or
other assets could sell or transfer the assets while the litigation was
pending. This transfer or sale would undermine adjudication, impair-
ing the ability of the party contesting ownership to obtain appropriate
relief.70
Eventually, U.S. courts began to address a countervailing con-
cern: that the remedy of attachment gave an unfair advantage to the
moving party, much as the general warrant in England had given the
Crown an edge over its political foes. 71 This inequality was most evi-
dent in consumer transactions, where a merchant could use attach-
65 See Levy, supra note 64, at 405.
66 See id. at 419-21.
67 See id. at 420, 428.
68 See id. at 420-21.
69 See Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 16 (1991).
70 Justice Frankfurter analyzed attachment in this fashion, also warning that if a court va-
cated an attachment, prompt judicial review was necessary to ensure that transfer of the asset
formerly subject to attachment did not make the entire substantive proceeding an "empty rite."
See Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Columbiana Del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684, 689 (1950).
The same principle underlies the stay of certain trial rulings, such as removal of a noncitizen,
pending appeal. The noncitizen's removal by immigration authorities will make it materially
more difficult for that individual to contest the substantive bases for her removal, given the
obstacles to litigation when the individual has been deported to a foreign country. In writing for
the Court on the importance of stays pending appeal of removal orders, Chief Justice Roberts
recently cited another opinion by Justice Frankfurter. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 427
(2009) (noting that inherent power of appellate court to grant a stay affirms the integrity of the
appellate process, ensuring that the reviewing court need not choose "between justice on the fly
or participation in what may be an 'idle ceremony"' (citing Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC,
316 U.S. 4, 10 (1942))).
71 Cf Ronald Goldfarb, The History of the Contempt Power, 1961 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 8
("The process of attachment ... was one used by the judges ... by which those who interfered
with the king's peace were brought before the court and punished.").
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ment or self-help to regain control of merchandise that a consumer
had purchased under an opaque agreement that favored the
merchant's interests.72 As part of the Warren Court's due process
revolution, the U.S. Supreme Court limited a party's ability to summa-
rily attach assets or use self-help without judicial imprimatur to regain
possession.73 However, the Court continued to permit the remedy in
cases involving heightened ex parte factfinding. Attachment was avail-
able when a merchant who had sold goods conditioned on regular
payments by the purchaser submitted concrete proof of the purchase
agreement and the purchaser's default.74 Similarly, attachment was ap-
propriate when the party seeking this remedy could provide a con-
crete showing of exigent circumstances, such as proof that the party
being sued was seeking to sell, transfer, or borrow against assets that
would be required to satisfy a judgment on the merits.75
While an attachment at common law was often obtained ex parte,
other types of relief also do not entail an adverse party. Consider eq-
uitable receiverships sought jointly by both fiduciaries and creditors of
insolvent corporations.76 Before federal bankruptcy law provided au-
tomatic stays of litigation, borrowers and creditors would join in appli-
cations to Article III courts to order establishment of an equitable
receivership. 77 In cases of railroad insolvency, creditors such as banks
would join with railroads to seek this relief.78 Speed was imperative in
granting such relief; without prompt action, other litigation or unilat-
eral action by some creditors would dissipate the railroad's assets,
frustrating the judicial process. The creditors benefited from the
power of a receivership to protect the railroad's assets, which could
then be used to satisfy the creditors' claims. The railroad would bene-
fit because establishment of a receivership would stay other litigation
by creditors, permitting orderly restructuring.79
In other relief not necessarily involving adverse parties, courts
can also appoint receivers or special masters to administer "struc-
tural" injunctions or consent decrees that reform public institutions
72 See N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606-08 (1975); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972).
73 See cases cited supra note 72.
74 E.g., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 601, 603 (1974).
75 See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 16 (1991).
76 Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1386-87; see, e.g., In re Metro. Ry. Receivership, 208
U.S. 90, 107 (1908); cf Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 11 (1944) (holding that federal judicial
power exists to render judgment even when claim is "uncontested or incontestable").
77 Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1386.
78 Id.
79 Id.
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such as prisons or jails.80 While these remedial measures emerge from
adversarial litigation brought by plaintiffs who claim that institutional
practices have violated their rights, the court on its own motion can
order relief such as appointment of a special master. 81 The court's or-
der empowers the special master to find facts through nonadversarial
means, and to report directly to the court on the master's investiga-
tion.82 The appointment of a special master enhances the factfinding
capacity of courts in the remedial stage of litigation. This move thus
compensates for information asymmetries that could impair the
court's ability to render judgment. It gives the court access to informa-
tion that might otherwise remain in the possession of one or more of
the parties, who each have agendas that might limit their inclination to
share such information with the tribunal.83 Giving the court access to
such information through appointment of a special master also per-
mits the implementation of more flexible relief. Instead of relying on
the parties' remedial prescriptions, the court can fashion a decree that
combines the best elements from a range of perspectives. 84 These rem-
edies, which may involve the use of nonadversarial processes, were
part of the suite of remedies available to courts at common law. Such
relief therefore became part of federal courts' remedial arsenal pursu-
ant to the Judiciary Act of 1789,85 which authorized federal courts'
80 Id. at 1387. The central studies for institutional reform litigation date back to the activist
1970s. See OWEN M. Fiss, INJUNCTIONS (1972); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1300-01 (1976). For a broad view of the stakeholders in
such cases, see Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as Liti-
gation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 1994-95, 2017, 2019, 2022 (1999) (book review).
81 See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 502, 504 (2011) (upholding decree, based in part on
reports by special master, that remedied inadequate medical and psychiatric care in California
prisons by requiring release of inmates from overcrowded facilities); cf. Horne v. Flores, 557
U.S. 433, 447-50 (2009) (asserting that courts entering and enforcing an equitable decree that
reforms public institutions such as school systems must be attentive to changed circumstances
that undermine decree's original purpose); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization
Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1018-20 (2004) (discuss-
ing collaborative, experimental approach to implementation of structural remedies); Margo
Schlanger & Pauline Kim, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Structural Re-
form of the American Workplace, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1519, 1527-38 (2014) (discussing evolv-
ing approaches to implementing workplace reforms).
82 See, e.g., Plata, 563 U.S. at 516 (upholding decree based in part on special master's
reports directly to the court).
83 E.g., id. at 516, 523.
84 Id. at 513, 529 (affirming lower court's reliance on testimony from prison officials, ex-
pert witnesses, as well as reports from special master and receiver to craft a remedy).
85 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
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resort to any and all remedies that stemmed from the "inherent" pow-
ers of courts.86
In sum, nonadversarial processes are no stranger to federal courts
or to the common law. When speed, secrecy, or flexibility are re-
quired, courts in both civil and criminal proceedings have a range of
nonadversarial processes available. These processes may not be suffi-
ciently pervasive to constitute an entirely discrete branch of federal
jurisdiction. 87 However, there is nonetheless ample precedent for their
use in situations such as warrants, attachments, and receiverships that
might otherwise result in threats to the courts' own remedial power
and factfinding abilities, or might pose an unacceptable risk of over-
reaching by one or more parties to a dispute.
C. Ex Parte Proceedings and the Administrative State
The status of ex parte proceedings under Article III became even
more complicated with the growth of the regulatory state, starting in
the late nineteenth century. An important circuit decision by the influ-
ential Supreme Court Justice Stephen J. Field appeared to classify ad-
verse parties as indispensable for Article 111.88 Justice Field's principal
concerns in this decision were threefold: (1) absolutely protecting pa-
pers relevant to litigation, a stance quickly rejected by Justice Field's
colleagues on the Supreme Court that relied on a broad view of En-
glish cases like Entick v. Carrington,89 (2) reducing the power of regu-
latory agencies in the nascent administrative state,90 and (3) ensuring
that federal courts retained the power to render final judgments.91
Viewed from the perspective of later developments in the case law,
only the third concern has continued relevance. The marginalization
of concerns (1) and (2) permits a more flexible reading of Justice
Field's account of Article III essentials.
In addressing the interaction of Article III and the administrative
state, it is useful to highlight the dangers of conflating two distinct
points: (1) the lack of adverse parties in a particular proceeding, and
(2) federal courts' determination of broad legal questions about the
scope of agency power. The presence of one of these factors, standing
86 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009).
87 This Article therefore takes a more cabined view of ex parte proceedings than commen-
tators Pfander and Birk. See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1440-41 (arguing for a broader
view that classifies ex parte proceedings as a distinct tributary in federal jurisdiction).
88 See In re Pac. Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 255, 257-58 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887).
89 See id. at 250-51.
90 See id. at 253-54.
91 See id. at 253-55.
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alone, has not been problematic. Warrants and various forms of civil
relief, such as attachment or receiverships, involve the first factor.92
Much of administrative law involves the second, as courts assess
whether particular agency rules or policies are consistent with the
agency's statutory mandate.93 Combination of contexts (1) and (2) is
rare, but not unprecedented. 94 Critics of the FISC's section 702 role
frequently fail to distinguish between these two concerns. 95
Blame Justice Field.96 In In re Pacific Railway Commission,97 Jus-
tice Field, sitting as a Circuit Justice, expressed hostility to the devel-
oping regulatory state and the need for regulators to have access to
documents generated by regulated businesses. 98 The Justice held that
Article III prohibited Congress from authorizing a federal court to
enforce ex parte an administrative subpoena issued by a federal
agency investigating a railroad's allegedly improper business prac-
tices. 99 The Supreme Court soon marginalized Justice Field's holding,
ruling squarely that Congress could authorize federal courts to en-
force agency subpoenas ex parte.100 However, Justice Field's language
has continued to sow uncertainty on the relationship between federal
judicial power and ex parte proceedings.
In ruling that Article III barred federal courts from enforcing
agency subpoenas, Justice Field also seemed motivated by a concern
voiced in the English case of Entick v. Carrington and by the Supreme
Court in Boyd v. United States101 on the sacrosanct nature of papers. 10 2
However, Justice Field's concern seemed misplaced in the context of
92 See, e.g., Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 65 (3d Cir. 1980) (Aldisert, J., dissenting)
(noting the difficulties presented by "the lack of sufficiently adverse parties" in the context of
attachment execution procedures).
93 See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014) (noting that statutory
interpretation should address both the particular context in which Congress uses language and
the broader context of the statute); see also King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489-90 (2015)
(upholding administrative interpretation of health insurance "exchange" on ground that this
reading was consistent with underlying statutory plan).
94 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2686-87 (2013) (adjudicating challenge to
DOMA despite government's agreement with merits of challenge).
95 See, e.g., Mondale et al., supra note 2, at 2276 (arguing that FISC's review of intelligence
collection procedures under section 702 is "[b]ulk adjudication ... foreign to Article III courts").
96 Pfander and Birk do. See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1421 (criticizing Justice
Field's opinion as providing an incomplete view of federal courts' historical practice).
97 32 F. 241 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887).
98 Id. at 253-54.
99 Id. at 258-59.
100 See Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 476-77 (1894).
101 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
102 See In re Pac. Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. at 250-51 (noting that "[o]f all the rights of the citizen,
few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of
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agency efforts to obtain documents relevant to conduct of a regulated
corporation. Entick and the other English cases stemmed from sub-
stantive revulsion at general warrants' chilling of speech that still reso-
nates today10 3 In contrast, Justice Field's opinion in Pacific Railway
Commission flowed from an outmoded resistance to the power of
Congress to establish agencies to regulate interstate commerce and
the discretion of those agencies to adopt procedures and rules of evi-
dence that were less formal than those used by courts.10 4 Nevertheless,
Justice Field's language regarding Article III has continued to spur
debate.
The principal questions have focused on the breadth of Justice
Field's language identifying the presence of adverse parties as a condi-
tion for the exercise of federal judicial power. In defining the claims
cognizable in federal courts, Justice Field referred to the "claims of
litigants brought before the courts for determination by such regular
proceedings as are established by law or custom for the protection or
enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress, or punishment of
wrongs. ' 10 5 While Justice Field's use of the term "litigants" could refer
either to adverse parties in a single case or to a series of ex parte
litigants in unrelated matters, the Justice's effort to clarify his meaning
spurred further questions.
Justice Field explained that the term "case" in Article III "implies
the existence of present or possible adverse parties whose contentions
are submitted to the court for adjudication. ' 10 6 This language has mo-
mentous implications for proceedings conducted ex parte. A broad in-
sistence on actual adverse parties, coupled with a narrow definition of
the class of "possible" adverse parties, would rule out most ex parte
proceedings. On the other hand, a more generous construction of
"possible" adverse parties would leave many ex parte proceedings un-
disturbed, since many, such as warrant applications, entail possible ad-
verse parties-e.g., warrant requests align the government against the
interests of an absent, but "possible" adverse party: the proposed tar-
get of surveillance.
Justice Field also worried about another issue that was not ger-
mane to the case before him, but that triggered concern by the Justices
personal security, [including] .. .exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the
inspection and scrutiny of others").
103 See Stuntz, supra note 57, at 393-95.
104 See In re Pac. Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. at 257 (criticizing agency's view that it was not bound
by rules of evidence and could receive "information of every character," including hearsay).
105 Id. at 255.
106 Id. (emphasis added).
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of the Supreme Court in the Founding Era: the finality of federal
court judgments. 10 7 The case law defines finality broadly: a "final" de-
cision is one not subject to revision by an executive source. 0 8 Justice
Field, in holding that a federal court could not enforce the subpoena
issued by the agency, cited the facts of a Founding Era decision,
Hayburn's Case.109 The statutory scheme that triggered questions by a
majority of Justices in Hayburn's Case involved a mere judicial recom-
mendation of pension eligibility, which the executive branch was free
to reject. 110 Although the pension scheme also involved an ex parte
determination, the finality concern seems far more integral to the Jus-
tices' rationale for doubting the scheme's validity under Article IRI."
Perhaps Justice Field believed that a finality problem existed be-
cause the railroad regulatory agency, having had the federal court find
its subpoena lawful, could at any time withdraw its subpoena request.
However, this possibility does not affect the finality of the court's
judgment. In many situations, a litigant who seeks a remedy and ob-
tains it from a court can subsequently withdraw or modify that appli-
cation. That is certainly true in the case of warrants. While a court can
approve a warrant, it is up to the government to follow through with
the surveillance that the court approved. The need to follow through
does not affect the finality of a court's review of the initial warrant
request, in which the court decides only that the law permits the sur-
veillance. Judicial review of either a subpoena or a warrant request
would raise finality concerns under Hayburn's Case only if law en-
forcement authorities could override a judicial denial. In situations
short of this scenario, a judicial finding is still final for purposes of
Article 111.112
107 See id. at 258 (citing Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792)).
108 See, e.g., id. at 258.
109 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792); see In re Pac. Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. at 258 (citing Hayburn's
Case, 2 U.S. 409).
11o See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1426; see also United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 40, 51-52 (1851) (ruling that Court lacked power under Article III to make recommenda-
tion to executive branch regarding claims brought by Spanish nationals allegedly injured by U.S.
Army operations in Florida).
111 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1431-32.
112 Id. at 1461 (noting that judicial approval of extradition is a final judgment, even though
executive branch retains the leeway to decide not to extradite (citing DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181
F.3d 865, 870 (7th Cir. 1999))); cf. Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 576, 578 (1926) (holding
that ex parte grant of naturalization petition was final for Article III purposes, even though
government could seek to vacate citizenship certificate if certificate was obtained through fraud
or other illegal conduct).
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Today, ex parte proceedings occur in relatively self-contained
realms, such as warrant requests or applications for civil remedies
such as attachment. Typically, those realms involve fact-specific situa-
tions, such as the activities of a particular proposed subject of surveil-
lance. Most cases involving broader legal questions feature adverse
parties. 113 However, there are exceptions. For example, in United
States v. Windsor,114 the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Ken-
nedy, struck down the federal Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"),
even though the Obama Administration's decision not to defend
DOMA arguably eliminated the adverse party that Justice Field
would have viewed as central.1 15 Justice Kennedy countered that while
adverse parties were customary, their presence was a "prudential"
feature that promoted "judicial self-governance," not a rigid Article
III requirement. 116 On this view, adverse parties help ensure that cases
turned on legal and factual issues, not policy disputes best left to the
political branches. However, the hardship and inefficiency of leaving
DOMA's constitutionality for another day seemed to outweigh these
concerns in Windsor. In reaching this decision, the Court was bol-
stered by the presence of a vigorous amicus curiae that argued for
upholding DOMA, providing the "sharp . . . presentation of the is-
sues" that adverse parties typically offer.117
If another source, such as an amicus, provides the court with an
opposing view, an actual adverse party adds little to the litigation
equation. A party's specific factual circumstances often play no role in
the resolution of broad legal questions. In administrative law, for ex-
113 Advisory opinions trigger Article III issues because they ensnare the courts in address-
ing hypothetical questions rather than concrete disputes. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S.
346, 353-55 (1911). However, the Court has ruled that declaratory judgment actions, which
merely flip the ordinary order of parties commencing a lawsuit, possess the adversity that Article
III requires. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937) (noting that Article III
"did not crystallize into changeless form the procedure of 1789 as the only possible means for
presenting a case or controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts" (quoting Nashville,
C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933))).
114 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
115 Id. at 2680, 2695-96.
116 Id. at 2685 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)); cf. Bradford C. Mank,
Does United States v. Windsor (the DOMA Case) Open the Door to Congressional Standing
Rights?, 76 U. Pr-r. L. REV. 1, 8 (2014) (suggesting that Windsor will "pave the way for in-
creased congressional participation" in cases where the executive branch agrees with a party
challenging the statute that a statute is unconstitutional); Ryan W. Scott, Standing to Appeal and
Executive Non-Defense of Federal Law After the Marriage Cases, 89 IND. L.J. 67, 74 (2014)
(describing Windsor's treatment of absence of adverse parties as a "sharp break with prior
precedent").
117 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2688.
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ample, courts regularly hear challenges to agency rules and policies.
Those challenges address whether the agency's rules and policies con-
form to the agency's governing statute and to the federal Administra-
tive Procedure Act.118 Frequently, the party challenging administrative
rules or policies is an umbrella group, such as an industry trade associ-
ation, whose interests coincide with a broad cross section of businesses
in the industry that the agency regulates. 19 Beyond this coincidence of
interests, the individual factual circumstances of the trade association
do not figure in the litigation, which proceeds on a far higher level of
abstraction.120 The breadth of the issues presented in the case does not
undercut a reviewing court's exercise of federal judicial power under
Article III. To that extent, criticism of the FISC's role under the FAA
as too general 21 is misplaced. Admittedly, it is rare to decide such
broad questions ex parte. However, it is commonplace to decide such
matters through court review of agency rules, where the individual
factual circumstances of the litigants are largely irrelevant to
adjudication.
II. ENACTING AND AMENDING FISA: THE ARTICLE III DEBATE
With this history of ex parte remedies in mind, we can now turn
to the history of FISA. Congress enacted FISA in 1978 as a frame-
work with hybrid purposes that echoed the rationale for ex parte
factfinding on warrant requests. 122 FISA's framework permitted the
government to uncover data linked to the fluid realm of foreign intel-
ligence. By establishing the FISC, Congress also endeavored to deter
the government from unilaterally expanding the keyhole of foreign
intelligence into an open window on all domestic communications.
118 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.); see, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489
(2015). See generally Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Con-
gress's Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REv. 62 (2015) (analyzing
Chief Justice Roberts's approach to discerning Congress's plan regarding health insurance ex-
changes in King v. Burwell, and contrasting that approach with textualism associated with the
late Justice Antonin Scalia and standard administrative law's deference to agency rules).
119 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
39 (1983) (action brought by automobile insurance companies for review of an order the Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration rescinding crash protection requirements of a fed-
eral motor vehicle safety standard).
120 See Vladeck, supra note 2, at 1178-79.
121 See, e.g., Mondale et al., supra note 2, at 2254.
122 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified
as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
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From the start, FISA was an effort to fashion structural remedies
for executive branch abuses documented in the U.S. Senate Church
Committee Report,123 such as the warrantless surveillance of domestic
opponents.124 FISA followed the Supreme Court's decision in Keith
holding that warrantless government surveillance of supposed domes-
tic security threats violated the Fourth Amendment.12 5 In enacting
FISA, Congress took up Justice Powell's invitation in Keith to have
Congress act.126 Central to the architecture that Congress established
was the judicial role suggested by Justice Powell, refined by Congress
into establishment of the FISC.127 Congress made clear that the inde-
pendent check provided by the FISC was integral to the boundaries
that FISA placed on executive discretion. This check would curb the
warrantless surveillance that the Court had struck down in Keith, as
well as the other abuses detailed in the Church Committee report.
The original FISA debate featured arguments about the necessity
of structural reform that continue to resonate today. One camp as-
serted that the executive branch abuses documented in the Church
Committee Report were reflective of a particular time and place, and
not representative of future executive branch performance. In the fu-
ture, according to this camp, the executive branch would self-correct
due to increased legislative, media, and public scrutiny. An able wit-
ness advocating for this position before Congress, former Acting At-
torney General Laurence Silberman (later Chief Judge of the FISA
Court of Review ("FISCR")) asserted that structural change was not
123 See FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERA-
TIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, S. REP. No. 94-755 (1976).
124 See DONOHUE, supra note 4, at 9-12; FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ JR. & Aziz Z. HuQ,
UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR 53-54 (2007);
Zachary K. Goldman, The Emergence of Intelligence Governance, in GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE
OVERSIGHT: GOVERNING SECURITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 207, 209-13 (Zachary K.
Goldman & Samuel James Rascoff eds., 2016); Mondale et al., supra note 2, at 2259-62. Execu-
tive unilateralism on surveillance dates back to the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. See
generally Neal Katyal & Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the Legality of the
NSA Surveillance Program: The FDR Precedent, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1023 (2008).
125 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972).
126 See id. at 322-24 (suggesting in dicta that questions about national security surveillance
could go to a "specially designated court" and that the court's review could be governed "in
accordance with such reasonable standards as the Congress may prescribe"); see also Subcom-
mittee Hearings, supra note 41, at 30 (testimony of John M. Harmon, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office
of Legal Counsel) (noting that "the Supreme Court has indicated that Congress might fashion a
warrant procedure for domestic intelligence," and also citing D.C. Circuit's decision suggesting
warrant requirement even for surveillance of foreign embassies in United States, Zweibon v.
Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 656-57, 656 n.205 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
127 See S. REP. No. 95-604, at 5 (1977) (explaining the FISC's function in adjudicating war-
rant requests targeting a "foreign power or an agent of a foreign power").
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necessary. 128 While Silberman acknowledged that the executive
branch had overreached in the policies that led to the Keith decision,
he claimed that the publicity attending disclosure of these abuses
would obviate the risk of their recurrence. 129
Silberman also warned of potential Article III problems with a
court that would review applications for surveillance focused on the
acquisition of foreign intelligence, rather than the investigation of
crime. According to Silberman, issuance of warrants in ordinary crimi-
nal cases was compatible with Article III because warrants were "an-
cillary" to a criminal prosecution with two adverse parties: the
government and the criminal defendant.130 For Silberman, a judicial
role would wade into the watery realm of the "traditionally prohibited
advisory opinion, ' 131 immerse the courts in matters beyond their
power, and threaten the president's prerogatives in foreign affairs.
132
On the other side, civil liberties advocates did not expressly dis-
cuss Article III concerns, but believed that the proposed legislation
gave government too much power. Civil liberties advocates counseled
against congressional authorization of investigations not squarely
based on detecting actual crimes.133 Urging that the proposed court
retain a criminal law standard for the issuance of warrants, civil liber-
ties advocates criticized any attempt to move beyond that standard.
134
Indeed, in remarkably frank testimony, then-Attorney General Grif-
fin Bell, who had inveighed against warrantless wiretapping as a fed-
eral district judge, informed the House committee that then-Vice
President Walter Mondale also wished to retain a criminal law stan-
128 See Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 41, at 232 (suggesting that statutory reform de-
signed to enhance disclosure to Congress would suffice to address abuses, and contending that
legislative branch, with its popular mandate to "stand for the people," would protect public
interest more effectively than "lifetime tenured judges").
129 Id. at 218. This argument presages arguments made today. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER &
ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 4-5
(2010). For a more subtle and multidimensional account of executive power that includes the
courts, see JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AF-
TER 9/11 (2012).
130 See Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 41, at 223-24; Vladeck, supra note 2, at 1167-68
(discussing testimony).
131 See Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 41, at 224.
132 As Chief Judge of the FISCR, Silberman conceded that subsequent Supreme Court
decisions had limited the force of his Article III concerns with the original FISA. See In re
Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 732 n.19 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (discounting Article III objections).
133 See Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 41, at 297-300 (letter from George M. Hasen,
Chairman, Committee on Civil Rights, Association of the Bar of the City of New York).
134 See id.
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dard, although the Attorney General favored a more flexible
approach.135
Another influential voice, former Watergate Deputy Independent
Prosecutor Philip Lacovara, testified for the compromise embodied in
the bill. Lacovara had authored a widely read law review article that
both criticized executive overreaching and claimed that courts could
issue warrants to investigate foreign intelligence matters such as the
activities of foreign diplomats in the United States, even absent a
showing of probable cause that a crime had been committed.1 36 For
Lacovara, the federal judicial power, configured as the FISC in FISA's
scheme, was a check respected by the legislature, the executive
branch, and the public.1 37 The role of the FISC was both a meaningful
constraint on executive power and "symbolic" of the surveillance
framework's legitimacy. 138
The Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC")
asserted that the crux of the Article III issue was the presence of "ad-
versity in fact."'1 39 Adversity in fact entailed intrusions on a target's
privacy, whether or not the target knew of the government's efforts.140
This position leaned heavily on the issuance of warrants and the Su-
preme Court's earlier decision in United States v. Pope,'141 noting that
the lack of an adverse party at a particular stage in proceedings was
not fatal under Article III if there were possible adverse parties at
other phases of the proceedings. 142 The OLC's reasoning amply cov-
135 See id. at 33, 35 (testimony of Attorney General Griffin Bell, noting that he and Vice
President Mondale held "different views," with Vice President Mondale preferring a "straight
criminal standard" that would condition issuance of a warrant on the government showing prob-
able cause that a crime was being committed or about to be committed, while Attorney General
Bell believed it was more appropriate to link surveillance to a showing that a proposed target
was an agent of a foreign power).
136 See Philip A. Lacovara, Presidential Power to Gather Intelligence: The Tension Between
Article H and Amendment IV, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 106, 107-09, 123-24 (1976).
137 See Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 41, at 228 (arguing that judicial role would per-
suade public that "foreign intelligence collection was being more responsibly administered" than
it had been in the past).
138 See id. at 228, 230-31.
139 Id. at 28 (quoting 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3530, at 165 (1975)).
140 See id.
141 323 U.S. 1, 11 (1944); cf Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1978) (upholding
judicial immunity regarding ex parte sterilization on grounds that state law did not bar exercise
of jurisdiction over ex parte order); In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 911 (Reg'l
Rail Reorg. Ct. 1974) (upholding statutory procedure for railroad reorganization despite lack of
requirement of adversarial pleadings).
142 See Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 41, at 28-29.
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ered traditional FISA.143 However, the OLC's focus on individual
targets may not justify the more general judicial review of targeting
procedures contemplated by the FAA.
Traditional FISA was joined in 2008 by the FAA, which re-
sponded to another epochal executive overreach: the Terrorist Sur-
veillance Program ("TSP"). After 9/11, the Bush administration
unilaterally directed the NSA and other agencies, collaborating with
the private sector, to collect both certain content information from
communications made or received by U.S. persons and metadata, such
as the numbers called. 14  The Bush administration ran the TSP outside
FISA's constraints, such as FISC approval.145 After New York Times
reporters disclosed the existence of the TSP, the Justice Department
persuaded the FISC to permit a modified form of the TSP.146 When at
least one FISC judge declined to reauthorize the program, Congress,
in a bipartisan effort including then-Senator Barack Obama, first
passed the Protect America Act 147 in 2007, and followed that with the
FAA in 2008.148
The role of the FISC under the FAA triggers Article III questions
more acute than those presented by the original FISA legislation.
Under section 702 of the FAA, the government may target the con-
tents of communications in which one participant is a non-U.S. person
reasonably believed to be located abroad when the surveillance will
result in the collection of foreign intelligence information. 149 To com-
ply with section 702, the government submits a certification to the
143 Courts found on these grounds that traditional FISA complied with Article III. See
United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1196 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
144 See Banks, supra note 9, at 1641-42.
145 See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 181 (2007) (discussing stance of Bush administration officials such as
Vice President Dick Cheney and his counsel, David Addington, in the period following 9/11,
noting that these officials "dealt with FISA the way they dealt with other laws they didn't like:
they blew through them in secret based on flimsy legal opinions that they guarded closely so no
one could question the legal basis for the operations"); Banks, supra note 9, at 1641-42.
146 See Banks, supra note 9, at 1641-43.
147 Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (repealed 2008).
148 See DONOHUE, supra note 4, at 31-38; Banks, supra note 9, at 1643-45. See generally
Joel Brenner, FISA and Foreign Intelligence: Getting the History Straight, 51 New Eng. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2017) (reviewing DONOHUE, supra note 4), http://joelbrenner.com/fisa-and-foreign-
intelligence-getting-the-history-straight/ (text at nn.50-66).
149 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (2012). Portions of the discussion in this subsection originated in
earlier articles. See Margulies, supra note 35, at 17-20; Peter Margulies, Reauthorizing the FISA
Amendments Act: A Blueprint for Enhancing Privacy Protections and Preserving Foreign Intelli-
gence Capabilities, 12 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 23, 28 (2016); Peter Margulies, The NSA in Global
Perspective: Surveillance, Human Rights, and International Counterterrorism, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2137, 2140-41 (2014).
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FISC describing its targeting procedures, as well as minimization mea-
sures that reduce the likelihood that analysts will use or retain purely
domestic communications. 150 The FISC has jurisdiction to review
these procedures. 151 However, unlike either ordinary warrants, where
courts find probable cause regarding a crime, or traditional FISA, in
which the FISC finds probable cause of a link to a foreign power,
under section 702, the FISC does not review individual targets of sur-
veillance.152 The absence from the certification process of both indi-
vidual target reviews and actual adverse parties distinguishes the
FISC's role under the FAA. 153
Under section 702, foreign intelligence information that the gov-
ernment may acquire includes data related to national security, such
as information concerning an "actual or potential attack or other
grave hostile acts [by] a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power. '154 Foreign intelligence information also comprises informa-
tion relating to possible sabotage 155 and clandestine foreign "intelli-
gence activities. ' 156 Another prong of the definition is broader,
encompassing information relating to the "the conduct of the foreign
affairs of the United States. 157
150 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h), 1881a(g). This Article, following common usage in U.S. na-
tional security law, defines U.S. persons as U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents. See id.
§ 1801(i). Similar protections cover persons physically located within the United States. See id.
§ 1881a(b). The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause does not
protect non-U.S. persons (i.e., individuals who are not citizens or lawful permanent residents)
located outside the territorial United States. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259, 266, 274-75 (1990).
151 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(1)(A).
152 PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'Ns TECHS., LIBERTY AND SE-
CURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 135-36 (2013) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GROUP].
153 Cf. Orin Kerr, Article III Problems with Appellate Review in the Leahy Bill?, LAWFARE
(July 30, 2014, 4:26 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/article-iii-problems-appellate-review-
leahy-bill (suggesting that statutory changes setting up certification procedure for review of
FISC decisions by FISCR and Supreme Court could run afoul of Article III).
154 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1)(A).
155 Id. § 1801(e)(1)(B).
156 Id. § 1801(e)(1)(C).
157 Id. § 1801(e)(2)(B). The United States also conducts surveillance of exclusively foreign
communications under Executive Order 12,333 ("EO 12,333"). See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3
C.F.R. 200 §§ 2.1-2.3 (1981). After Edward Snowden's disclosures, President Obama issued
Presidential Policy Directive 28 ("PPD-28"), which provided greater transparency and ultimately
yielded detailed procedures governing foreign surveillance. See Press Release, Office of the
Press Sec'y, Presidential Policy Directive-Signals Intelligence Activities (Jan. 17, 2014), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-directive-signals-intelligence
-activities; NSA, PPD-28 SECTION 4 PROCEDURES: USSID SP0018: SUPPLEMENTAL PROCE-
DURES FOR THE COLLECTION, PROCESSING, RETENTION, AND DISSEMINATION OF SIGNALS IN-
TELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND DATA CONTAINING PERSONAL INFORMATION OF NON-UNITED
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Commentators have highlighted the effectiveness of the section
702 program. For example, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board ("PCLOB") recognized that section 702 had generated infor-
mation about the structure, operation, and plans of terrorist groups.15 8
The President's Review Group adopted the same position.1 59 How-
ever, as section 702 heads toward its sunset in 2017,160 civil liberties
advocates and scholars continue to question the statute's costs to pri-
vacy 161 and its compliance with Article 11J.162
STATES PERSONS 7 nn.1-2 (2015), https://fas.org/irp/nsa/nsa-ppd-28.pdf; see also Peter Margulies,
Surveillance by Algorithm: The NSA, Computerized Intelligence Collection, and Human Rights,
68 FLA. L. REV. 1045, 1059-60 (2016) (discussing EO 12,333). In 2015, the Court of Justice of the
European Union ("CJEU") struck down Safe Harbor, a U.S.-European Union ("EU") privacy
agreement governing trans-Atlantic corporate data transfers, on grounds that U.S. surveillance
under both section 702 and EO 12,333 violated EU privacy rules. See Case C-362/14, Schrems v.
Data Prot. Comm'r (Oct. 6, 2015), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=
CELEX:62014CJ0362 (document at 25-26). Subsequently, the United States and EU approved a
new agreement, Privacy Shield, which sought to respond to the CJEU's decision. See European
Comm'n, Commission Implementing Decision of 12.7.2016 Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by the EU-
U.S. Privacy Shield 4 (Dec. 7, 2016). Commentators have critiqued the CJEU's Schrems decision
on the grounds that it imposed unworkable rules and vastly understated current constraints on
U.S. intelligence collection, including those provided under section 702. See Margulies, supra;
Christopher Kuner, Reality and Illusion in EU Data Transfer Regulation Post Schrems 11 (Univ.
of Cambridge, Paper No. 14/2016, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=273
2346; Peter Swire, US Surveillance Law, Safe Harbor, and Reforms Since 2013 10-11 (Ga. Tech.
Scheller Coll. of Bus., Research Paper No. 36, 2015), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/
White-Paper-Swire-US-EU-Surveillance.pdf.
158 PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PRO-
GRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECrION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
ACT 107 (2014) [hereinafter PCLOB § 702 REPORT], https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-
Report.pdf.
159 See PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GROUP, supra note 152, at 145 (noting that in great majority
of counterterrorism investigations since 2007 "that resulted in the prevention of terrorist at-
tacks[,] ... information obtained under section 702 contributed ... to the success of the investi-
gation"); cf. Shedd et al., supra note 9, at 1-2 (praising effectiveness of program); Swire, supra
note 157, at 2 (same). But see DONOHUE, supra note 4, at 38 (taking more skeptical view of
intelligence programs' effectiveness).
160 Cf. Mieke Eoyang, Beyond Privacy and Security: The Role of the Telecommunications
Industry in Electronic Surveillance 15-16 (Hoover Inst., Aegis Series Paper No. 1603, 2016),
http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/eoyang-privacysecurity-final-v3-digital
.pdf (arguing that government should delegate more screening of section 702 data to private
sector to minimize government intrusions on U.S. persons' private information). See generally
David S. Kris, Trends and Predictions in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance: The FAA and Beyond
(Hoover Inst., Aegis Series Paper No. 1601, 2016), http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/re
search/docs/kristrendspredictions-final v4_digital.pdf (discussing cutting-edge questions Con-
gress should address in FAA reauthorization).
161 See DONOHUE, supra note 4, at 68-72 (noting privacy issues with section 702); cf. Margo
Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency's Civil Liberties Gap, 6 HARV.
NAT'L SEC. J. 112, 113 (2015) (suggesting that U.S. intelligence community lawyers and policy-
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III. THE FAA AND ARTICLE III: CONGRUENCE OR CONFLICT?
The most convincing answer to the Article III questions raised by
section 702's critics flows from application of criteria governing the
congruency of the FISC's role with Article 111.163 The congruency in-
quiry, first announced in the context of reconciling Article III and the
Appointments Clause, also offers guidance on other tasks that Con-
gress has assigned to federal courts. 164 In each context, congruency
turns on: (1) the operational values that Congress sought to optimize
in volatile areas such as national security, foreign affairs, and emerg-
ing technology; (2) the structural values served by the statute; (3) the
task's consistency with federal courts' history and practice; (4) the
availability of alternatives; and (5) limits on the role that Congress
asked courts to play. The first two Sections below broadly address the
themes of structure and operational values such as speed, secrecy, and
accuracy. The following Sections apply the factors described above to
the FISC's role under the FAA.
A. Congruence and Constitutional Structure
The congruency test is best described in Morrison v. Olson, in
which the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
held that Article III did not bar Congress from lodging the power to
appoint independent prosecutors in the D.C. Circuit. 65 Morrison
noted that the Appointments Clause gives Congress the power to au-
thorize federal courts to appoint inferior officers. 166 The question for
the Court was whether having the D.C. Circuit appoint an indepen-
dent counsel to investigate alleged misconduct by a senior executive
branch official would be "incongruous," in light of the Article III role
of the D.C. Circuit's judges.1 67 The term "incongruous" generally
means a relationship lacking harmony or fit, 168 given the attributes of
one or both sides of the relationship. A relationship in which attrib-
utes operate at cross-purposes, or where an individual, thing, or entity
makers do not adequately incorporate costs to civil liberties into overall assessments of pro-
grams' value).
162 See generally Mondale et al., supra note 2; Strossen, supra note 2.
163 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 676 (1988) (citing Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371,
398 (1879)). Neither Siebold nor Morrison expressly articulates the indicia of congruence. This
Part seeks to refine and distill the approach taken in these cases and more recent case law.
164 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 676.
165 Id. at 677.
166 Id. at 673-74 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
167 Id. at 676.
168 See Incongruous, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/in
congruous [https://perma.cc/Q3GM-3BLS] (last visited Apr. 30, 2017).
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would be expected to do something not in keeping with its typical or
traditional purpose, would be incongruous. 169 By the same token, a
relationship in which attributes harmonized would meet the test of
congruency that the Morrison Court identified.170
For Chief Justice Rehnquist, several factors were important. First
was structure: Congress, the Chief Justice observed, acted to alleviate
"conflicts of interest that could arise in situations when the Executive
Branch is called upon to investigate its own high-ranking officers."'171
Chief Justice Rehnquist's understanding of this factor was doubtless
informed by the backdrop of the independent counsel statute,'72 which
Congress had enacted to prevent a repeat of the infamous Saturday
Night Massacre in which then-President Nixon had fired the Water-
gate Special Prosecutor, former Solicitor General Archibald Cox. 173
Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis of the need to ensure indepen-
dent investigations of alleged executive branch misconduct acknowl-
edged that alternatives to judicial appointment risked the appearance
of executive influence.174 The clearest alternative was appointment of
the independent counsel by senior executive branch officials, such as
the Attorney General. However, the Saturday Night Massacre illus-
trated the perils of this option, at least when the president was as des-
perate to avoid investigation as Richard Nixon turned out to be. Chief
Justice Rehnquist may have shared the view expressed by Justice
Scalia in a memorable dissent that Congress's framework was un-
wise. 175 However, for Chief Justice Rehnquist, the structural rationale
that Congress had embraced was worthy of deference.
In addition, Chief Justice Rehnquist considered the degree to
which the D.C. Circuit's statutory appointment power interfered with
Article III duties. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that courts on occa-
169 See id.
170 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 676.
171 Id. at 677. The Watergate scandal was one of several catalysts for reform efforts of the
1970s. The warrantless political surveillance of that era led to the Court's holding in Keith that
such government intrusions were unconstitutional. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith),
407 U.S. 297, 321-23 (1972). Justice Powell, writing for the Court in Keith, saw federal courts'
review of national security surveillance requests as a useful reform measure, and invited Con-
gress to legislate on the subject. Id. at 323. Congress did so, just as it legislated on the judicial
appointment of independent counsel to investigate the executive branch.
172 28 U.S.C. § 595 (2012). The U.S. Office of the Independent Counsel was eliminated in
1999 upon sunset of the underlying statute. See id. § 599.
173 See generally ELAINE W. STONE, THE GENESIS OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STAT-
UTE (1999), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/1999/O6/oid6591.pdf.
174 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677.
175 See id. at 700-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Morrison litigation stemmed
from the criminalization of a political dispute between Congress and the executive branch).
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sion made appointments on an ex parte or sua sponte (on the court's
own motion) basis. For example, a court had the inherent power to
appoint a special prosecutor to investigate and try lawyers for alleged
contempt of court.1 76 Courts can also appoint others close to the judi-
cial process, including federal marshals, certain U.S. commissioners,
and interim U.S. Attorneys.1 77 In this sense, appointment of a special
prosecutor was not a foreign or idiosyncratic task for an Article III
court. Moreover, the statute ensured that federal judges remained im-
partial by barring any judge who had participated in the appointment
from participating in any judicial proceeding involving the indepen-
dent counsel.1 7
At the same time, the Court relied on the limited reach of the
statute at issue. The unspoken assumption of the Court was that seri-
ous executive misconduct was not a daily occurrence, and therefore
appointment of independent counsels pursuant to this statutory proce-
dure would be relatively rare. Chief Justice Rehnquist expressly noted
that the independent counsel would perform only "limited duties" tied
to the investigation and prosecution of a limited range of federal
crimes.1 79 In appointing an officer with such a limited portfolio, the
D.C. Circuit would not get involved, even indirectly, in matters of pol-
icy properly left to the discretion of senior executive branch offi-
cials.180 These practical limits also influenced the Court's view that
Congress's addition to the D.C. Circuit's role was constitutionally
sound.
176 Id. at 676 (majority opinion) (citing Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.,
481 U.S. 787 (1987)).
177 Id. at 676.
178 Id. at 683-84. In this portion of his opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited an opinion by
Justice O'Connor that had upheld a congressional scheme for efficient resolution of disputes
between commodities brokers and their customers that allowed the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission to hear common law counterclaims that would ordinarily be heard in state court or
by an Article III tribunal. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
841-43 (1986). Rejecting reliance on "formalistic and unbending rules," id. at 851, Justice
O'Connor noted the limited nature of the agency's role, suggesting that those limits demon-
strated that the statute did not "impermissibly intrude on the province of the judiciary," id. at
851-52. The Supreme Court has also held that the federal courts have rulemaking authority over
functions of the judicial branch. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 386-91 (1989)
(upholding participation of federal judges on sentencing commission).
179 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671.
180 Id. at 671-72.
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B. Deference to Operational Values: National Security, Foreign
Affairs, and Emerging Technologies
Case law, including two cases from the October 2015 term, illus-
trates that the Court generally accords Congress a measure of defer-
ence in the interaction between Article III and federal courts'
activities. That deference seems broadest when the subject concerns
national security and foreign affairs or changes in technology. Each of
these areas is dynamic, entailing frequent shifts in alignment and gov-
erning paradigms. They "arise in connection with efforts to confront
evolving threats in an area where information can be difficult to ob-
tain and the impact of certain conduct difficult to assess."181 In each of
these areas, Congress has better access than the courts to information
necessary to make informed decisions.182 An unduly literalist or
mechanical approach by courts to Congress's powers under Article I
or limits imposed by Article III may result in a vision of governance
that is "strained and impracticable, ' 183 and thus antithetical to the
Framer's scheme.
To be sure, that deference is not absolute, since Congress's im-
mersion in politics may lead it to discount courts' distinctive role and
commandeer the courts for tasks that overtly or more subtly erode
judicial independence. 184 However, some measure of deference re-
garding the contours of Article III is appropriate in the areas of na-
tional security, foreign affairs, and changing technology. 18 5 When, as in
the case of the FISC's role under section 702, Congress has relied on
the courts to supply a structural check on executive power that harmo-
nizes well with courts' traditional functions, the case for deference is
that much stronger.
181 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34, 39 (2010) (holding that statute that
barred material support of foreign terrorist groups was consistent with the First Amendment).
182 See generally Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REv. 1361
(2009).
183 Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 396 (1879); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting that, "[w]hile the Constitution diffuses
power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed
powers into a workable government").
184 See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 502-03 (2011) (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 39
(1957)) (cautioning that even "[s]light encroachments" can herald significant threats to judicial
independence). Courts must also be vigilant regarding the Constitution's protections for access
to the courts. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795 (2008) (striking down statute that
precluded access to habeas corpus for Guantanamo detainees).
185 See Chesney, supra note 182, at 1383 n.84 ("The case arises in the context of Congress'
authority over national defense and military affairs, and perhaps in no other area has the Court
accorded Congress greater deference." (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65
(1981))).
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In one recent case, Bank Markazi v. Peterson, the Court rejected
an Article III challenge to a statute that designated particular prop-
erty as subject to attachment or execution by victims of state-spon-
sored terrorism. 86 The property was owned by Iran, and the
legislation aimed to send a strong message to Iran and other state
sponsors of terror that such a stance was at odds with fundamental
norms.187 The statute also sought to provide justice to the victims and
their families, who had often been frustrated by the difficulty of find-
ing assets with which to satisfy the judgments against Iran that they
had already obtained.18 8 The defendants claimed that Congress, by
designating particular assets as subject to judicial remedies sought by
the plaintiffs, had intruded on the prerogatives of the judicial branch
under Article 111.189
The Article III objection here did not turn on the absence of ad-
verse parties: the case featured plaintiffs-the surviving relatives of
victims of terrorism-who had sued entities that the courts had found
to be responsible for those attacks. 190 However, the very specificity of
Congress's directive to the courts to consider particular assets as sub-
ject to execution of the judgments that the plaintiffs had obtained1 91
nicely bookends the generality of the FISC's mandate under the FAA.
The former is not typical of Congress's guidance to courts on reme-
dies, while the latter is not typical of courts' role in matters such as
warrant requests that do not feature actual adverse parties asserting
opposing positions. In this sense, Bank Markazi is a useful template
for the questions at issue under section 702.
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, noted that the political
branches had long had a "controlling role" in foreign affairs and that
deference was therefore appropriate to Congress's exercise of
power. 192 Justice Ginsburg noted that Congress and the President had
repeatedly "exercised control" over the resolution of claims against
other nations and the judicial treatment of foreign assets.193 For exam-
186 See 22 U.S.C. § 8772 (2012); Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1329 (2016).
187 See 22 U.S.C. § 8772(a)(2).
188 See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1316-17.
189 See id. at 1321.
190 See id. at 1319.
191 The statute did not require courts to issue any particular remedy. It permitted other
parties to demonstrate that they, not Iran, were the owners of the assets. See id. at 1325. It also
permitted other parties, including creditors of Iran, to prove that they had a legally superior
claim to the assets. See id. at 1325 & n.20 (citing district court's view that statute "left it 'plenty
... to adjudicate"').
192 Id. at 1328.
193 Id.
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ple, in Dames & Moore v. Regan,1 94 the Court had upheld presidential
action, taken against a backdrop of legislative acquiescence, to settle
particular claims by U.S. individuals or entities against Iran.1 95 Con-
gress has also over time granted the President authority to block spe-
cific assets linked to rogue states or subject those assets to judicial
remedies.
1 96
Moreover, as Justice Ginsburg noted and our earlier discussion of
attachments made clear, remedies such as attachment are inherently
not final judgments for Article III purposes. Instead, as Justice Frank-
furter observed, attachment is collateral to a judgment, providing the
means for ensuring that the judgment can be satisfied.1 97 A collateral
remedy, like a consent decree, 198 is always modifiable. In the case of a
collateral remedy, additional investigation by the parties or changes in
the law can always reveal more assets to satisfy an outstanding
judgment.
By identifying such assets, Congress acted in a fashion entirely
consistent with the purpose of attachment and similar remedies: pre-
serving the integrity and efficacy of the judicial process by ensuring
that assets are available to pay a party that prevails on the merits.
Congress made the judgment that identifying specific assets was nec-
essary to achieve this goal in the daunting arena of litigation against
state sponsors of terrorism, who are not known for their transparency
or compliance with fair accounting principles.199 The Court's defer-
ence merely recognized Congress's superior competence to make this
policy judgment.200
194 453 U.s. 654 (1981).
195 Id. at 688.
196 See id. at 673, 681.
197 See Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Columbiana Del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684,
688-89 (1950).
198 See Home v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 447 (2009).
199 See Kilburn v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 376 F.3d 1123, 1130 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (observing that "terrorist organizations can hardly be counted on to keep careful book-
keeping records"); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000) (re-
marking that "terrorist organizations do not maintain open books").
200 Chief Justice Roberts, who dissented, was troubled by Congress's focus on a particular
case, viewing this as a threat to judicial independence. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct.
1310, 1329 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that Article III "commits the power to de-
cide cases to the Judiciary alone"). Chief Justice Roberts's overall concern was appropriate; con-
gressional action with respect to every federal case (or even a small percentage of the total)
would render the justice system both unfair and unworkable. Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts
may have been particularly troubled by assertions at the oral argument by plaintiff's counsel Ted
Olson (ironically, Olson decades earlier had challenged the independent counsel law upheld in
Morrison) that "no limiting principle" could temper Congress's plenary authority. See Transcript
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The importance of deference to Congress in matters of evolving
technology or technological change was addressed, albeit less conclu-
sively, in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins.20 1 Spokeo recognized that Congress
has a role to play in fixing the precise boundaries of a crucial compo-
nent under Article III: injury in fact.202 According to Justice Alito,
who wrote for the Court, the injury in fact test serves much the same
purpose as the presumption favoring adverse parties: it ensures that
courts will be considering a concrete legal or factual dispute amenable
to judicial resolution, not a policy disagreement or camouflaged re-
quest for an advisory opinion.2 3 To this end, the Court has repeatedly
noted that to constitute injury in fact, an alleged harm had to be both
"concrete and particularized," and "actual or imminent, not 'conjec-
tural' or 'hypothetical.' "204
Although Spokeo addressed provisions of the Fair Credit Report-
ing Act of 1970 ("FCRA"), °2 5 the tone and tenor of Justice Alito's
opinion, as well as Justice Alito's prior discussions of search and
seizure issues, suggested that technological change buttressed the case
for deference to Congress. The second paragraph of Justice Alito's
opinion situated the case in the realm of evolving technology, noting
that Spokeo, the defendant firm accused of unfair credit reporting,
runs a "'people search engine' . . . [that] conducts a computerized
of Oral Argument at 42, Bank Merkazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016) (No. 14-770); cf id.
(reporting Chief Justice Roberts's incredulity that once Congress acts, the Court's only role is to
"sign on the dotted line"). However, before determining that Congress had intruded unduly on
the courts' remedial discretion, Chief Justice Roberts could have given more weight to the inher-
ently modifiable nature of attachment and other remedies, which Justice Frankfurter had dis-
cussed in Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Columbiana Del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684, 689
(1950).
201 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
202 See id. at 1549.
203 See id. at 1547.
204 E.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). In Spokeo, Justice Alito asserted that the Court's prece-
dents made a claim's concreteness and particularity, respectively, into separate elements. See
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548. Justice Alito justified the Court's remand to the Ninth Circuit on
grounds that the circuit court had failed to parse concreteness and particularity separately in its
analysis of injury in fact. See id. at 1550. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg asserted that the case
law relied on by Justice Alito had instead viewed concreteness and particularity as intermingled
attributes, not separate inquiries. See id. at 1555 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Accordingly, Justice
Ginsburg saw no need for a remand to the Ninth Circuit, and would have found that the plaintiff
had established standing based on the particularity of his claim. Id. at 1556. The precise content
of the Court's standing test is beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, this Article's praise
of deference derives support from Justice Alito's acknowledgment of Congress's role in identify-
ing types of injuries that meet Article III minima. See id. at 1549-50 (majority opinion).
205 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); see Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1545.
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search in a wide variety of databases and provides information about
the subject of the search. '206 While Congress presumably did not fore-
see the development of the Internet when it enacted the FCRA in
1970, Justice Alito's analysis seemed to suggest that the ease of aggre-
gating databases online highlighted the urgency of Congress's
concerns.
207
Against this backdrop of rapid technological change,208 Justice
Alito suggested that Article III contemplated a measure of deference
to Congress in its assessment of whether individuals protected by a
206 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1544; see also id. at 1546 (describing Spokeo as a corporation that
"operates a Web site that allows users to search for information about other individuals").
207 Justice Alito has also suggested that legislatures merit a measure of deference when
they address the impact of new technologies on Fourth Amendment searches and seizures. See
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring in part and judgment)
(urging that Congress act to regulate law enforcement's digital searches of suspects' smart
phones, citing legislation enacted in 1968 to guide electronic surveillance such as wiretaps, and
asserting that the Legislature was in the best position to balance technology's facilitation of
"serious crimes" with its effect on "very sensitive privacy interests"); United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400, 429-30 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (expressing wish that Congress would
legislate procedures for law enforcement use of GPS to track criminal suspects, with an inferred
argument for deference to the Legislature's ability to "gauge changing public attitudes,.... draw
detailed lines, and.., balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way"). Circuit courts
have also favored deference to Congress. See United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 889-90
(6th Cir. 2016) (finding that statutory standard for government access to suspect's cell-site loca-
tional information was consistent with Fourth Amendment, noting that "Congress has specifi-
cally legislated on the question before us today, and in doing so has struck the balance reflected
in the Stored Communications Act"); ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 824-25 (2d Cir. 2015)
(declining to hold that Fourth Amendment would bar NSA program that collected call records
from most U.S. landline telephones, suggesting that, "the legislative process has considerable
advantages in developing knowledge about the far-reaching technological advances that render
today's surveillance methods drastically different from what has existed in the past"). The Fourth
Amendment context presents somewhat different questions than the Article III domain, since
the Fourth Amendment's inclusion of the term "unreasonable" seems to leave room for the kind
of societal consensus that legislation connotes. However, one can find language in the Article III
case law that gestures toward a similarly pragmatic outlook. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371,
396 (1879) (warning courts not to adopt "strained and impracticable view of the nature and
powers of the national government"). Scholars have presented mixed views on the interaction of
the Fourth Amendment and statutes. For an argument that judicial deference to legislatures on
searches is inappropriate, see Orin S. Kerr, The Effect of Legislation on Fourth Amendment
Protection, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1117, 1121 (2017); cf. William Baude & James Y. Stern, The
Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L. RaV. 1821, 1874-75 (2016) (argu-
ing, based on analogy to positive law governing interactions of private parties, that courts should
not defer to statutes such as Stored Communications Act that impose standards lower than prob-
able cause for government access to electronic communications). See generally Orin S. Kerr, An
Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REv. 476 (2011) (ad-
vancing model of judicial response to technological change).
208 Cf City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010) (noting that courts "risk error by
elaborating too fully on" Fourth Amendment rules amidst "[r]apid changes in the dynamics of
communication and information transmission").
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federal statute had alleged an injury that was "legally cognizable"
under Article 111.209 Deference to Congress was appropriate, Justice
Alito stated, regarding whether an intangible injury that did not in-
volve direct or visible harm to the plaintiff's person or property pos-
sessed the concreteness necessary for an injury in fact.210 Justice Alito
noted that "both history and the judgment of Congress play important
roles. 211 In addition, he asserted that Congress is "well positioned to
identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III require-
ments. '212 Congress's judgment on this score is therefore "instructive
and important. ' '213 There are limits to Congress's role; Congress could
not require courts to hear a case under the FCRA that entailed an
allegation of a "bare procedural violation" unrelated to a harm actu-
ally suffered by the plaintiff, such as a credit reporting agency's failure
to disclose its ultimate customer's identity to a seller of credit informa-
tion.214 However, within those limits, Congress was entitled to a mea-
sure of deference.
A deferential strand regarding Congress's exercise of Article I
authority also runs through the cases on legislative establishment of
tribunals that lack Article III's protections of judicial independence.
In parsing Chief Justice Marshall's early approval of territorial courts
whose judges lacked lifetime tenure where establishment of Article III
tribunals would be inefficient, Justice Harlan urged avoidance of
"dogmatic" and "doctrinaire" approaches, counseled "flexibility," and
asserted that Chief Justice Marshall was "conscious as ever of his re-
sponsibility to see the Constitution work. ' 215 In Commodity Futures
209 See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578
(1992)).
210 See id.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id.; cf. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578; id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (acknowledging that
"Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to
a case or controversy").
214 See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
215 Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 546-47 (1962). For scholarly arguments justifying
flexibility for Congress in establishing non-Article III tribunals as long as Article III courts re-
tain some authority over decisions rendered by such tribunals, see Paul M. Bator, The Constitu-
tion as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Article I1, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 266
(1990) (arguing for deference to Congress's Article I powers); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legisla-
tive Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 992 (1988) (assert-
ing that appellate review by Article III courts is sufficient); James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals,
Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 775-76
(2004) (arguing that bankruptcy courts and other tribunals that are adjuncts of Article III courts
do not pose insurmountable Article III problems).
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Trading Commission v. Schor,216 the Court upheld a statute which per-
mitted a federal administrative agency, the Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission ("CF-IC"), to adjudicate state law counterclaims
brought by broker/dealers against customers who had lodged com-
plaints against those broker/dealers with the CFTC.217 Justice
O'Connor, writing for the Court, noted that the efficient resolution of
disputes by the CFTC was essential to an "effective . . . regulatory
scheme. '218 Here, too, deference had its limits: Justice O'Connor
noted that the spectrum of claims that could be heard by the agency
was narrow in scope.2 19 The agency thus did not threaten a wholesale
displacement of state or federal courts in the adjudication of tradi-
tional state law contract or property claims.22°
C. Operational Concerns and the FAA
Addressing the FISC's role under the FAA entails consideration
of both the national security and foreign affairs factors that influenced
the Court in Bank Markazi and the impact of new technology that
shaped Justice Alito's opinion in Spokeo. The speed and dynamic na-
ture of risk in the Internet age drove Congress's decision to focus the
FISC on review of government procedures, not individual instances of
surveillance. That decision should receive a measure of deference.
216 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
217 Id. at 857.
218 Id. at 855.
219 See id. at 856; cf. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 500, 503 (2011) (citing absence of clear
limits in striking down bankruptcy provision that permitted adjudication of tort claim).
220 The D.C. Circuit recently held that the conviction of a former aide to Osama bin Laden
on conspiracy charges related to his role in preparations for the 9/11 attacks did not violate
Article III. See Bahlul v. United States, 840 F.3d 757, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc) (per
curiam). For scholarly commentary on the interaction of Article III and military tribunals, com-
pare David Glazier, Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of the Military Commission, 46 VA.
J. INT'L L. 5, 74-75 (2005) (expressing skepticism about military commissions), Jonathan Hafetz,
Policing the Line: International Law, Article III, and the Constitutional Limits of Military Juris-
diction, 2014 Wis. L. REV. 681, 693-713 (same), and Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Courts and
Article Ill, 103 GEo. L.J. 933, 965-66 (2015) (arguing that military commissions violate Article
III if they venture beyond trial of specific recognized international law violations), with Geoffrey
S. Corn & Chris Jenks, A Military Justice Solution in Search of a Problem: A Response to
Vladeck, 104 GEo. L.J. ONLINE 29 (2015), https://georgetownlawjournal.org/articles/162/mifitary-
justice-solution-search/pdf (arguing that deference to Congress's judgments regarding military
tribunal jurisdiction is consistent with Framers' vision, including values of fairness, discipline,
and civilian control), and Peter Margulies, Justice at War: Military Tribunals and Article 11, 49
U.C. DAvis L. REv. 305 (2015) (recommending deference to Congress as long as underlying
charge, overt acts listed in charging instrument, and proof at trial have reasonable relationship to
international law).
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The challenges faced by U.S. law enforcement and national secur-
ity personnel overseas have led the Supreme Court to hold that the
Fourth Amendment did not require a warrant for investigations over-
seas of persons without ties to the United States.221 In United States v.
Verdugo- Urquidez,Z2 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that "[s]ituations
threatening to important American interests may arise halfway
around the globe," requiring a swift and decisive U.S. response.2 3 Re-
quiring ex ante judicial approval of searches in every case would
"plunge [U.S. officials] into a sea of uncertainty. ' '224 Chief Justice
Rehnquist warned that requiring ex ante judicial approval would re-
sult in "significant and deleterious consequences for the United States
in conducting activities beyond its boundaries. ' '225 Justice Kennedy
agreed that these considerations rendered a warrant requirement "im-
practicable and anomalous. 12 26
The need for expeditious and effective action is most salient in
responding to transnational threats to cybersecurity. In the cyber do-
main, an intrusion may occur in a microsecond, resulting in the pilfer-
ing of massive amounts of intellectual property or personal
information.227 Because of the architecture of the Internet, national
221 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990).
222 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
223 See id. at 275.
224 Id. at 274.
225 Id. at 273; cf United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980)
(holding that Fourth Amendment was subject to exception for collection of foreign intelligence
and observing that "attempts to counter foreign threats to ... national security require the
utmost stealth, speed, and secrecy").
226 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in result)).
227 Moreover, those threats are growing exponentially. See P.W. SINGER & ALLAN FRIED-
MAN, CYBERSECURITY AND CYBERWAR: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 60 (2014) (observ-
ing that in 2010, a major vendor of Internet security software "was discovering a new specimen
of malware [virus-laden software spread over the Internet] every fifteen minutes," and "[i]n 2013
it was discovering one every single second"); see also Daniel Garrie & Shane R. Reeves, An
Unsatisfactory State of the Law: The Limited Options for a Corporation Dealing with Cyber Hos-
tilities by State Actors, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1827, 1835 (2016) (noting "growing willingness of
state actors [such as China, Iran, and North Korea] to use their cyber capabilities against private
companies"); Eric Talbot Jensen, The Future of the Law of Armed Conflict: Ostriches, Butterflies,
and Nanobots, 35 MICH. J. INT'L L. 253, 271 (2014) (citing "numerous examples of private hack-
ers, organized groups, and business organizations using the Internet to do great harm to both
private and public entities"); David E. Pozen, Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 221,
235-36 (2016) (discussing government surveillance as remedy for transnational privacy threats
such as organized hacking efforts by state and nonstate actors). Hacking from abroad has al-
ready had an impact on the 2016 presidential election. See Paul Rosenzweig, More DNC Leaks,
LAWFARE (Aug. 13, 2016, 10:47 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/more-dnc-leaks (discussing
Russia's apparent hacking into Internet communications of U.S. Democratic National Commit-
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boundaries are largely irrelevant to the mounting and detection of
cyber threats.228 Detecting such plots on a global scale requires excep-
tionally quick analysis, facilitated by computer networks designed to
look for threat patterns and signatures autonomously-i.e., without
specific ex ante human direction.229 The hours or days preparing a re-
quest for an ordinary warrant or traditional FISA court order are an
eternity in this volatile environment.23 0
D. The FISC and Structural Concerns
While a measure of deference to Congress is appropriate given
the importance of expeditious responses to transnational cyber
threats, the emerging technology of the Internet also exacerbates
structural threats to constitutional governance. In Morrison v. Olson,
the Court relied heavily on Congress's view that judicial appointment
of independent counsel would alleviate structural threats posed by the
prospect of the executive branch investigating itself.2 31 Analogous
threats posed by emerging technology to the ordinary warrant system
supply a further rationale for deference regarding the FISC's role
under the FAA. These threats also demonstrate that the FISC's role
tee). Indeed, experts now believe that the NSA itself has been hacked, most likely by Russia. See
Nicholas Weaver, NSA and the No Good, Very Bad Monday, LAWFARE (Aug. 16, 2016, 10:34
AM), https://lawfareblog.com/very-bad-monday-nsa-0.
228 Both Congress and the courts are in the early stages of sorting through the legal impli-
cations of the transnational pivot to cyberspace. See Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re
Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.), 829
F.3d 197, 233 (2d Cir. 2016) (Lynch, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing for amending statute to
better address appropriate balance between law enforcement's need for access to data stored
abroad by U.S. corporation and corporation's need to maintain stable relationships with govern-
ments around the world). For further insight on these issues, compare Jennifer Daskal, The Un-
Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 329, 332 (2015) (arguing that the Internet has pro-
foundly disrupted traditional conceptions of jurisdiction and sovereignty), with Andrew Keane
Woods, Against Data Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729, 734-35 (2016) (arguing that chal-
lenges posed by Internet are amenable to resolution using traditional legal concepts).
229 See Margulies, supra note 157, at 1061-75; cf. Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v.
Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 773, 813-14 (2015) (urging courts to apply Daubert
test for scientific evidence to validation of computer search techniques).
230 These operational concerns shaped the deferential tone of the Fourth Circuit in United
States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980). In addition to finding a foreign
intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment in a case that arose prior to FISA's enactment,
the Fourth Circuit asserted in dicta that Congress's subsequent judgments in foreign intelligence
surveillance merited deference. See id. at 914 & n.4 (suggesting that Congress's care in drafting
FISA counseled deference to the "intricate balancing performed in the course of the legislative
process by Congress and the President" and demonstrated that "the political branches need
great flexibility to reach the compromises and formulate the standards which will govern foreign
intelligence").
231 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677 (1988).
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fits the checking function that independent courts have historically
performed.
The emerging landscape of the Internet provides opportunities
for government intrusions, just as it provides an opening for attacks by
foreign states and nonstate actors. Under section 702, the NSA's up-
stream program collects a significant number of communications at
the Internet's backbone. 232 The data collected by the NSA takes the
form of communications "transactions, ' 233 which the transmittal path-
ways of the Internet have aggregated or divided to aid efficient trans-
mission.234 One common type of transaction, called a multi-
communication transaction ("MCT"), includes many individual com-
munications, analogous to a page of emails.2 35 Some of these commu-
nications may be one-end foreign in nature, involving communication
between a U.S. citizen or resident and an individual abroad. However,
many communications within any given MCT are purely domestic, in-
volving communication between two U.S. citizens or lawful residents,
or two persons physically located in the United States.23 6
The disparate nationalities of the senders and recipients of com-
munications within any given MCT create a legal quandary. MCTs
mix and match domestic and foreign communications, regardless of
the nationality of the communication's sender or receiver.2 37 Under
both the Fourth Amendment and U.S. statutes, the NSA would have
to obtain a court order if it had targeted purely domestic communica-
tions for surveillance.2 38 However, given the NSA's current technolog-
ical limits, the agency will incidentally collect MCTs containing
domestic communications when it targets one-end foreign messages
that happen to be included in those MCTs.239 If the agency could rum-
mage through all the contents of such purely domestic communica-
tions, it would put a dent, if not a gaping hole, in the legal structure
regulating government access to domestic emails. Through the FAA's
232 See DONOHUE, supra note 4, at 55, 60.
233 See PCLOB § 702 REPORT, supra note 158, at 39.
234 See SINGER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 227, at 23-24 (discussing how servers use packets
of data to send information to an individual user's computer based on user requests).
235 See DONOHUE, supra note 4, at 60; PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GROUP, supra note 152, at 141
& n.138.
236 See Redacted, 2011 WL 10945618, at *11-12 (FISA Ct., Oct. 3, 2011); PCLOB § 702
REPORT, supra note 158, at 41.
237 See DONOHUE, supra note 4, at 60.
238 See Redacted, 2011 WL 10945618, at *23.
239 See DONOHUE, supra note 4, at 56-57, 60.
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certification process, the FISC can ensure that the NSA has proce-
dures in place to guard against this risk.240
Similarly, U.S. Internet users engaged in ordinary web browsing
of putatively domestic sites may inadvertently access links connected
to foreign servers, routers, and other elements of Web architecture.
As Jonathan Mayer observed, the Internet is called the World Wide
Web for a reason-among other attributes, many websites mix domes-
tic and international content and applications, sometimes in ways that
are not obvious to a visitor to the site.241 For example, the U.S. House
of Representatives website happens to include an Internet application
(an "app," in common parlance) for visitors who have difficulty read-
ing text-that application enables a speech version of the website's
content.242 That application entails contact with a dedicated server
each time the House of Representatives website loads.243 In the case
of the House website, the read-aloud app is authored by a firm incor-
porated in the United Kingdom, and the firm uses a server that simi-
larly appears to be located in that country.244 The Internet is replete
with such mixed and matched applications-the ease of combining
such applications regardless of geography is one of the Internet's great
strengths, but it also muddies the water of what constitutes a purely
domestic communication. Moreover, domestic emails with links to
such mixed sites may also appear to search algorithms as one-end for-
eign Internet traffic.
The FISC can identify these issues, impose rules for compliance,
and monitor the agency's performance.2 45 The government must notify
the FISC of noncompliance incidents.2 46 These incidents typically trig-
ger an extensive iterative process, through which the FISC seeks clari-
fication regarding corrective measures that the government has
undertaken. 247 For example, in 2011, a government report of past
240 See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
241 See Letter from Jonathan Mayer, Stanford Sec. Lab., to Review Grp. on Intelligence
and Commc'ns Techs., Office of the Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, JONATHANMAYER.ORG, Oct. 3,
2013, https://jonathanmayer.org/papers-data/dni-commentl3.pdf.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 See Berman, supra note 31, at 1207 (asserting, based on study of FISC decisions, that
the court "has taken seriously its role as gatekeeper"); cf BENJAMIN WITTES & GABRIELLA
BLUM, THE FUTURE Or VIOLENCE 135, 200-01 (2015) (conceding that in theory U.S. surveil-
lance could target disfavored groups but arguing that legal safeguards have greatly diminished
this concern).
246 PCLOB § 702 REPORT, supra note 158, at 29.
247 See id. at 30-31.
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overcollection in the upstream program led FISC Judge John Bates to
request a statistical sample of the Internet communications acquired
through the upstream program and hold a hearing on the issues raised
by that analysis.2 48 Ultimately, Judge Bates required changes in NSA
minimization procedures to more effectively limit retention of U.S.
person information unrelated to foreign intelligence. 249 While internal
agency protocols can contribute to such salutary outcomes, exclusive
reliance on internal protocols would not provide the same robust
check.250
To the extent that the FISC's role under section 702 contributes
to the continued integrity of the warrant process, the rationale for that
role is related to ordinary criminal prosecutions. Admittedly, the
FISC's role is one step removed from the criminal justice system, not
"ancillary" in the fashion of the warrant requests that Laurence Sil-
248 See id.; see also Redacted, 2011 WL 10945618, at *2-4 (FISA Ct., Oct. 3, 2011).
249 Redacted, 2011 WL 10945618, at *21-22, 30. A similar process at the FISC led to the
NSA's decision in April 2017 to halt so-called "about" collection. Collection of this kind entailed
scanning global Internet traffic for communications about a particular selector. "About" collec-
tion was more likely to result in the incidental collection of communications between U.S. per-
sons. See Name Redacted, at 19-30 (FISA Ct., Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/icotr/51117/2016_CertFISCMemoOpin_OrderApr_2017.pdf; Quinta Jurecic,
NSA Stops "About" Collection, LAWFARE (Apr. 28, 2017, 2:14 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.
com/nsa-stops-about-collection.
250 Cf. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (asserting that "the Founders did not
fight a revolution to gain the right to government agency protocols"). Chief Justice Roberts
readily conceded that such protocols were a "good idea," merely suggesting that protocols were
not sufficient in and of themselves. Id. This cautionary perspective does not impute bad faith to
the NSA or anyone else in the executive branch. It merely reinforces Madison's insight that both
external and internal controls on government are necessary. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra
note 8, at 323 (James Madison); see also David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 885, 914 (2016) (noting Madison's view that focus on virtue (or lack thereof) of individual
officials was distraction from design of institutions that would supply checks and balances); cf.
Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 529-47
(2015) (discussing fabric of constraint within executive branch).
Nor is congressional scrutiny the sole answer. Congress has its own agenda, which may leave
little time or inclination for robust oversight. See DONOHUE, supra note 4, at 66-68. Further-
more, Congress lacks the most effective tools for addressing attempts by the executive branch to
downplay noncompliance. Cf. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 819-20 (2d Cir. 2015) (observing
that in 2010 and 2011, members of Congress, apart from those on House and Senate intelligence
committees, often lacked awareness of domestic metadata program approved by FISC under
provision of USA PATRIOT Act); Margulies, supra note 35, at 46-47 (suggesting that executive
branch's written disclosures to Congress about 2009 compliance issues with domestic metadata
program did not fully acknowledge official responsibility for those problems). See generally
Kathleen Clark, Congress's Right to Counsel in Intelligence Oversight, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 915,
935-40 (arguing that members of Congress, particularly those not serving on the House and
Senate intelligence committees, face hindrances to obtaining access to classified materials on
intelligence collection).
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berman cited in the debates around FISA's 1978 enactment.251 But an
indirect nexus may be sufficient. In addition, the relationship between
the FISC and the judiciary's customary role in adjudicating warrant
requests suggests an analogy to the judicial participation on the U.S.
Sentencing Commission that the Court upheld in Mistretta v. United
States.252 Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun noted the aptness of
a statutory provision for federal judges' service on the Sentencing
Commission. 253 Citing Justice Jackson's observation in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer254 that the Framers' view of separation of
powers contemplated "'reciprocity' among the Branches" to form a
"workable government, '255 Justice Blackmun conceded that Congress
could "enlist[ ] federal judges to present a uniquely judicial view on
the uniquely judicial subject of sentencing. '256 In section 702, Con-
gress asked the FISC to perform a role related to the distinctively ju-
dicial province of adjudicating warrant requests. Warrant requests,
while perhaps not as close to the heart of the criminal justice system as
sentencing, are nonetheless integral to that system and to the Fourth
Amendment's regulation of criminal procedure. The FISC's role
under section 702 therefore merits the same pragmatic, deferential ap-
proach that the Court exhibited in Mistretta.257
E. Preserving the Essential Elements of Article III Proceedings
Another element of congruency under Morrison is the extent to
which the judicial action mandated by the statute preserves elements
251 See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
252 488 U.S. 361 (1989). In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the Supreme Court
held that under the Constitution the sentencing guidelines were advisory, not binding. Id. at
245-46 (Breyer, J.). However, the Booker Court made clear that this holding "does not call into
question any aspect of our decision in Mistretta." Id. at 242 (Stevens, J.).
253 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 407-08.
254 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
255 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 408 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
256 Id.
257 It is true, as Justice Blackmun noted in Mistretta, that the Sentencing Commission is not
a court. Id. at 408. In contrast, the FISC is a judicial body. Moreover, as the next subsection
describes, the FISC acts like a court. See infra Section III.E. It applies a statute in proceedings
with possible adverse parties (one of whom on at least one occasion became an actual adverse
party). Id. Those proceedings can entail the orderly submission of opposing views through amici
curiae and the final resolution of disputes related to injury in fact. Id. Such indicia of judicial
power reinforce the case for the FISC's compliance with Article III. Moreover, in Booker, the
Court observed that the Sentencing Commission's main constitutional problem if Congress had
established it as a court would have been the membership of individuals who were not Article III
judges. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 243. In contrast, the FISC consists entirely of jurists with Article
III protections.
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of Article III adjudication. In Morrison, Chief Justice Rehnquist com-
mented that the independent counsel statute did not supply the only
occasion for judges to make appointments.2 As he described, courts
have long had the authority to appoint a lawyer to assist in prosecu-
tion of a possible contempt. 259 This link to judicial tradition buttressed
the Court's holding that the appointment power provided to the D.C.
Circuit under the independent counsel statute did not suffer from in-
congruity under Article III. Along the same lines, the FAA promi-
nently displays indicia of congruency with the broad run of judicial
proceedings, including possible adverse parties, amici curiae present-
ing opposing views, and injury in fact.
The proceedings of the FISC appear to meet the formulation ar-
ticulated by Justice Field in Pacific Railway Commission, since FISC
matters include "possible adverse parties. '260 The FAA expressly per-
mits ISPs that receive directives from the government to hand over
data to seek judicial review.261 While communications and Internet
firms have rarely availed themselves of this right, in 2008, Yahoo did
litigate the lawfulness of directives it had received from the govern-
ment pursuant to the Protect America Act, the predecessor of the
FAA. 262 That litigation eventually resulted in an opinion by the
FISCR upholding the directives and the Protect America Act's consti-
tutionality.263 In addition, adverse parties can emerge in two other
258 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 676 (1988).
259 See id.
260 See In re Pac. Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 255 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887); cf Tutun v. United
States, 270 U.S. 568, 576-78 (1926) (in course of upholding ex parte adjudication of naturaliza-
tion by federal court, remarking that the government was a possible adverse party since the
citizenship certificate could be cancelled pursuant to an action brought by the Justice Depart-
ment if the naturalization applicant had procured the certificate by fraud or otherwise failed to
fulfill legal conditions). An important recent analysis asserts that Tutun did not rely heavily on
the presence of possible adverse parties in naturalization proceedings. See Pfander & Birk, supra
note 2, at 1393-1402. In that analysis, Pfander and Birk read Tutun more broadly as support for
the position that non-contentious jurisdiction is a discrete strand of federal judicial power that
raises no problems under Article III. Id. This Article agrees with Pfander and Birk that the
presence of possible adverse parties does not in and of itself resolve Article III concerns. How-
ever, instead of seconding Pfander and Birk's thesis that the absence of adverse parties connotes
a separate strand of federal jurisdiction, this Article looks case-by-case to indicia of congruency,
including the structural concerns that drove the Court's decision in Morrison v. Olson.
261 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(A) (2012) (stating that service provider receiving a directive
may petition the FISC to "modify or set aside such directive").
262 See Craig Timberg & Christopher Ingraham, You Think You've Got Bills? Government
Could Have Fined Yahoo Trillions of Dollars, WASH. POST: SWITCH (Sept. 15, 2014), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/09/15/you-think-youve-got-bills-government
-could-have-fined-yahoo-trillions-of-dollars/?utm-term=.9efbdef2395.
263 In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105b of the Foreign Intelligence
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contexts. First, aggrieved parties can sue the government for damages
based on wrongful surveillance, 264 although such suits may be rare, in
large part because of the secrecy that surrounds section 702 targeting.
Second, the government must notify criminal defendants when it uses
evidence derived from surveillance under section 702.265 The govern-
ment for some time did not properly fulfill this duty.2 66 Eventually, the
government began issuing such notifications, leading to the litigation
in United States v. Muhtorov. 67
Even in the absence of adverse parties, a court can use other
methods to simulate the "concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues. '2 68 The Court in Windsor cited opposing argu-
ments advanced by a vigorous amicus curiae.2 69 Similarly, even when a
FISC proceeding under section 702 has no adverse parties, the statute
provides the FISC with an opportunity to seek views opposing the
government. The FISC always had the power, like any Article III
court, to appoint an amicus curiae to present opposing views. In the
USA FREEDOM Act,270 Congress expressly established a panel of
amici to assist the FISC in resolution of novel legal questions.27 1 In the
most recent FISC decision on the constitutionality of section 702 and
other compliance issues, the FISC appointed distinguished Washing-
ton lawyer Amy Jeffress as amicus. 272 Jeffress argued vigorously that
section 702 violated the Fourth Amendment, clarifying the issues on
each side and thereby prodding the FISC to consider the legal ques-
tions in the case with greater depth, concreteness, and specificity. 273
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1016 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008); see Timberg & Ingraham, supra note
262.
264 50 U.S.C. § 1810.
265 Id. § 1806(d).
266 See Vladeck, supra note 2, at 1170.
267 187 F. Supp. 3d 1240, 1250-53 (D. Colo. 2015) (stating arguments on why FISC violates
Article III, but declining to decide issue).
268 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
269 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2687-88 (2013).
270 USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (codified at various
sections of title 50 of the U.S. Code).
271 50 U.S.C. § 1803(i) (2015); see also ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 829-31 (2d Cir.
2015) (Sack, J., concurring) (expressing concern about ex parte nature of most FISC proceedings
and suggesting that amici curiae or other source of arguments opposed to those of the govern-
ment would benefit the court); cf. Berman, supra note 31, at 1239-40 (discussing importance of
amici to the FISC's work).
272 See Name Redacted, at 6 (FISA Ct., Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/
20151106-702MemOpinionOrder forPublicRelease.pdf.
273 See Peter Margulies, Madison at Fort Meade: Checks, Balances, and the NSA, LAWFARE
(May 10, 2016, 12:45 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/madison-fort-meade-checks-balances-
and-nsa (discussing importance of Jeffress's work as amicus curiae). Another distinguished attor-
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Particularly in cases turning on legal, as opposed to factual issues, the
participation of amici can supply many of the virtues that one might
ordinarily expect from the presence of adverse parties.274
In addition, the core Article III requirement of injury in fact is
actually relatively easy to demonstrate in cases under section 702.
Under the statute, the government can engage in incidental collection
of U.S. person data, as long as it is not targeting those individuals. 275
The harm to privacy caused by incidental collection of data, while in-
tangible in nature, would-after Spokeo-clearly provide the particu-
larity and concreteness that the Court has identified as touchstones of
standing.276 The harm would be particular, since it would involve an
intrusion on the distinctive personal information of each person whose
data the government collected and retained. It would be concrete be-
cause incidental collection is an actual intrusion that exacerbates the
loss of personal control and spontaneity277 and exposes private data to
a greater risk of public disclosure.278 No more tangible harm would be
necessary to make out a claim of injury in fact.
ney, Marc Zwillinger, acted as amicus curiae in a recently disclosed opinion by the FISCR, which
reviews FISC decisions. See In re Certified Question of Law, No. FISCR 16-01, at 1-3 (FISA Ct.
Rev. Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.dni.gov/files/icotr/FISCR%200pinion%2016-01.pdf (holding
that when court-authorized pen register device that targets metadata, such as telephone numbers
called, results in incidental collection of post-cut-through digits ("PCTD")-numbers, such as
passwords, pressed after placing a telephone call-such incidental collection is not inconsistent
with statutes or the Fourth Amendment, assuming restrictions are in place to limit government
use of PCTD when it constitutes content, not merely call record information). See generally Orin
Kerr, Relative vs. Absolute Approaches to the Content/Metadata Line, LAWFARE (Aug. 25, 2016,
4:18 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/relative-vs-absolute-approaches-contentmetadata-line (dis-
cussing FISCR decision).
274 A full-time public advocate tasked with assisting the FISC in a broader range of cases
would be a welcome additional step. See Mondale et al., supra note 2, at 2297-98; Vladeck, supra
note 2, at 1176-77; see also DONOHUE, supra note 4, at 147 (viewing provision for amici as
helpful but recommending further measures to assure amici's independence and efficacy). See
generally Marty Lederman & Steve Vladeck, The Constitutionality of a FISA "Special Advo-
cate," JUST SECURITY (Nov. 4, 2013, 1:34 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/2873/fisa-special-ad-
vocate-constitution/ (discussing the constitutionality of an advocate). In addition to Amy
Jeffress, the FISC has named Professor Laura Donohue, former Assistant Attorney General
David Kris, and three other distinguished attorneys (Jonathan G. Cedarbaum, John D. Cline,
and Marc Zwillinger) as members of the amicus panel. See Individuals Designated as Eligible to
Serve as an Amicus Curiae Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(i)(1), U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SUR-
VEILLANCE CT., http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/amici-curiae [https://perma.cc/GLC4-GHJK] (last
visited Apr. 30, 2017).
275 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1) (2012).
276 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147-50 (2013) (assuming collection
of content of communications without consent would be legally cognizable injury).
277 See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK 94-95 (2007) (describing research sug-
gesting individual's awareness of pervasive surveillance may limit spontaneity).
278 See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1945-48
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While the FISC addresses such intrusions not through individual
review of surveillance but instead through approval of targeting pro-
cedures that will minimize invasions of privacy, 279 this broader review
is entirely consistent with the role of courts in countless administrative
law cases. Courts that adjudicate a challenge to an environmental reg-
ulation rarely dwell on the challenger's distinctive factual posture. In-
stead, courts deciding administrative law issues determine if the
regulation, which could potentially affect millions of people, is consis-
tent with the agency's governing statute and with the notice and com-
ment process of the Administrative Procedure Act.280 Viewed in this
light, the broader inquiry mandated by the FAA is entirely congruent
with the stance a reviewing court adopts in administrative law
matters .2
81
Nor do the FISC's determinations under section 702 pose a final-
ity problem. Unlike the pension disputes in Hayburn's Case that the
Justices of the early Supreme Court believed posed tensions with Arti-
cle 111,282 the FISC does not merely make a recommendation that the
executive branch can disregard. FISC approval of the government's
certification is a necessary condition for collection under the statute.283
If the FISC rejects a certification, the government must either cease
surveillance or revise its certification to address the court's concerns.
That makes the FISC's decisions final in a fashion that eluded the ten-
tative recommendations at issue in Hayburn's Case.
F Lack of Alternatives to the FISC
Because the congruency test has always been a practical one,28 4
the lack of alternatives to the statutory regime is an important ele-
ment. In Morrison, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Congress's wish to
avoid the conflict of interest caused by the executive branch investi-
gating itself; the only feasible alternative was appointment by the
courts.285 In the FAA context, alternatives to the FISC's role are im-
(2013) (discussing value of privacy for thinking and speaking freely without government intimi-
dation); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1151 (2002) (arguing
that privacy guards against "exercises of power employed to destroy or injure individuals").
279 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2).
280 See, e.g., Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014).
281 See Renan, supra note 16, at 1075 (arguing that "[r]eimagining the FISC as an adminis-
trative law court" advances debate about surveillance oversight).
282 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1431-32.
283 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(c)(1), (g).
284 See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 396 (1879) (cautioning against "strained and imprac-
ticable" visions of separation of powers).
285 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677 (1988).
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practicable because of (1) the sheer number of foreign targets, (2) the
danger of encroaching on executive power through unduly burden-
some regulation of those targets' selection, (3) the difficulty of estab-
lishing standing for individual complainants, and (4) the lack of
independence of non-Article III sources of review.
Because of the dynamic nature of foreign challenges, the NSA
has compiled a large target list.286 That list currently includes approxi-
mately 90,000 "persons" who are non-U.S. citizens and lawful re-
sidents located outside the United States.28 7 The number of targets
under section 702 makes it difficult to require a warrant or advance
court order for each and every target.
Moreover, courts would not have the authority to require the ex-
ecutive branch to make substantial reductions in the number of for-
eigners targeted. As noted above, the Supreme Court has held that
the Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant for searches con-
cerning non-U.S. citizens or residents overseas.2 88 Indeed, courts have
forged a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant clause, citing
separation of powers concerns. 289 As the FISCR noted, "requiring a
warrant would hinder the government's ability to collect time-sensi-
tive information and ... impede the vital national security interests
that are at stake. ' 290 This would make requiring a warrant imprudent.
Even more to the point, the time-sensitive aspects of foreign intelli-
gence collection make the preservation of a zone of executive discre-
tion a constitutional mandate. In Zivotofsky v. Kerry,291 the Court
cited functional considerations, including the president's ability to act
with "dispatch," as a basis for holding that the president's power to
recognize foreign states barred Congress from enacting legislation
286 See OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, STATISTICAL TRANSPARENCY RE-
PORT REGARDING USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES 5 (2016), https://www.dni.gov/
files/icotr/ODNI%20CY15 %20Statistical%20Transparency%20Report.pdf.
287 See id. The FAA defines the term "persons" broadly, to include not just individuals, but
also "any group, entity, association, corporation, or foreign power." See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(m);
PCLOB § 702 REPORT, supra note 158, at 21. The breadth of this statutory definition reinforces
the need to couple intelligence targeting with robust checks, including the FISC, amici curiae,
and, ideally, a full-time public advocate. Without such checks in place, intelligence agencies
might be tempted to exploit their technological prowess to find overseas repositories of U.S.
persons' private data, thus circumventing both the statute and the Constitution.
288 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990).
289 See In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105b of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1010-12 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008); United States v. Truong Dinh
Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913-14 (4th Cir. 1980).
290 In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105b of the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act, 551 F.3d at 1011.
291 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
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that classified disputed territory as belonging to a particular state.292
Those functional considerations would be even more acute in the case
of foreign intelligence collection.
Requiring a warrant for queries of U.S. person information inci-
dentally collected under section 702 is also not an adequate alterna-
tive to the FISC's current role under that provision. Admittedly, the
Constitution would probably not bar Congress from requiring a court
order for querying U.S. person data, given the Fourth Amendment
protections already in place for U.S. persons.2 93 However, requiring a
warrant for querying incidentally collected U.S. person data would not
address the systemic issues that the FISC currently examines, such as
the executive branch's overall procedures for preventing the targeting
of purely domestic communications. 294 Without this systemic review in
place, analysts skilled in computer searches might be able to craft non-
U.S. person queries that would still uncover substantial U.S. person
information in the NSA's vast databases. 295 Broader-based review of
targeting and minimization procedures is still necessary to preserve
U.S. persons' privacy rights. Because of this factor, requiring warrants
for querying incidentally collected U.S. person data would not be an
effective substitute for the FISC's current role.
292 See id. at 2086 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 70, supra note 8, at 423 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
293 A debate has already begun on the wisdom of including such a provision in the upcom-
ing 2017 reauthorization of section 702. Compare ELIZABETH GOITEIN & FAIZA PATEL, WHAT
WENT WRONG WITH THE FISA COURT 45-49 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/de
fault/files/analysis/WhatWent_%20Wrong-With TheFISACourt.pdf (setting out proposed
reforms), and Oversight and Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act: The Balance between
National Security, Privacy and Civil Liberties: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
114th Cong. (2016) (prepared statement of David Medine, Chair of the Privacy and Civil Liber-
ties Oversight Board, at 8), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05-10-16%20
Medine%20Testimony.pdf (detailing possible reforms), with Chris Inglis & Jeff Kosseff, In De-
fense of FAA Section 702: An Examination of Its Justification, Operational Employment, and
Legal Underpinnings 24-25 (Hoover Inst., Aegis Series Paper No. 1604, 2016), http://
www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/ingliskosseff-defenseof702-final-v3-digital.pdf
(arguing that this reform would downgrade intelligence capabilities without appreciable increase
in privacy), and Oversight and Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act: The Balance be-
tween National Security, Privacy and Civil Liberties: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 114th Cong. (2016) (testimony of Rachel L. Brand, Member of the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board, at 10, 12, 14), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05-10-
16%2OBrand%2OTestimony.pdf (same).
294 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d)(1)(B) (2012).
295 Cf Jonathan Mayer et al., Evaluating the Privacy Properties of Telephone Metadata, 113
PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. U.S. 5536, 5540 (2016) (illustrating how the unrestricted collection of
metadata such as call records, even without the collection of content, can reveal vast amounts of
personal information).
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Another alternative within Article III tribunals-direct chal-
lenges to surveillance by individuals-is impracticable because the se-
crecy surrounding such programs impairs any given individual's
standing to sue.296 The government does not usually inform subjects of
surveillance that they are currently under surveillance, since doing so
would hinder the government's ability to collect useful information.
Without this knowledge, subjects of surveillance lack the requisite
knowledge to even commence an action. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has been very guarded in recognizing standing to sue among
potential challengers to surveillance policy. The Court has demanded
clear and concrete proof that an individual is under surveillance, pre-
cisely because of the operational security that cloaks section 702 and
other surveillance programs. Indeed, in Clapper v. Amnesty Interna-
tional USA, 297 the Court denied standing to lawyers and journalists
working on topics related to national security, citing the threat to op-
erational secrecy that could result if standing were more liberally
granted. 298 As Justice Alito observed in his opinion for the Court,
more liberal standing rules might permit enterprising terrorists, for-
eign hackers, and other threats to national security to conduct fishing
expeditions in the guise of federal court challenges, to probe the
weaknesses of government surveillance. 299 In the wake of Edward
Snowden's disclosures, more individuals may be able to make out a
case for injury in fact based on information regarding section 702 that
is now publicly available. However, many others will still lack this
opportunity.
Similarly, it would be inadvisable to relegate questions about the
legality of section 702 surveillance to adjudication of motions to ex-
clude evidence in criminal trials. Under section 702, far more than
under traditional FISA, most targets will not see the inside of a court-
room. Instead, the government will inform counterintelligence and
counterterrorism activities with the intelligence it has collected. Wait-
ing for doctrine to evolve through suppression motions will delay ad-
judication unreasonably, and sometimes fail to resolve issues at all. In
this sense, rejecting adjudication by the FISC creates a gap in adjudi-
296 See generally David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 278, 282, 287 (2010)
(discussing framework, risks, benefits, and potential reform of deep secrecy practices in the
United States).
297 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
298 See id. at 1149 n.4.
299 See id. (noting that more liberal standing rules could "allow a terrorist ... to determine
whether he is currently under U.S. surveillance simply by filing a lawsuit challenging the Gov-
ernment's surveillance program").
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cation like the gap that the Court closed in United States v. Windsor by
considering DOMA's constitutionality even in the absence of an ad-
verse party.300
Flaws also undermine proposals for creating an independent ex-
ecutive branch agency to perform the ex post review that the FISC
now performs. In theory, this idea has merit. Indeed, the PCLOB cur-
rently reviews intelligence programs and writes exceptionally valuable
reports.30 1 However, no executive branch agency has the indepen-
dence or the authority necessary to serve as the exclusive source for
review of civil liberties issues linked to intelligence collection. 30 2 That
oversight task might be compromised by the ability of the President to
fire the agency chief for cause,30 3 or by legal or practical problems
associated with ensuring that the agency receives unfettered access to
the necessary information to perform its function. As an executive
agency, such an entity would inevitably turn to negotiation with other
executive branch agencies, such as the Director of National Intelli-
gence, to resolve access issues. However, the access required for ro-
bust review cannot be a matter for negotiation-rather, it is an
essential prerequisite for such review. Indeed, given the secrecy that
pervades intelligence collection, negotiating for access already con-
cedes the game. Without prior access, agency officials would not have
sufficient knowledge to conduct an effective negotiation.304 Moreover,
300 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2688 (2013) (observing that without adju-
dication of DOMA's legality, the "costs, uncertainties, and alleged harm and injuries [caused by
the statute] likely would continue for a time measured in years before the issue is resolved").
Admittedly, the issues in Windsor included pressing matters such as eligibility for tax refunds
and other benefits raised by the many federal statutes and rules affected by DOMA. See id. at
2686. The hardships caused by illegal surveillance may not be quite as tangible in nature. How-
ever, if Justice Alito's opinion in Spokeo is any guide, Congress should receive deference in
determining that an injury is sufficiently tangible to warrant consideration in a judicial forum.
See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016); supra notes 201-05 and accompanying
text (discussing Spokeo).
301 See, e.g., PCLOB § 702 REPORT, supra note 158. For a thoughtful discussion by one
current PCLOB member on intelligence oversight, see Rachel Brand, What Does Effective Intel-
ligence Oversight Look Like?, LAWFARE (May 3, 2016, 3:19 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
what-does-effective-intelligence-oversight-look.
302 For a more optimistic view, see Samuel J. Rascoff, Presidential Intelligence, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 633, 637, 646, 648-50 (2016), and compare it with Carrie Cordero, A Response to Profes-
sor Samuel Rascoffs Presidential Intelligence, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 104, 107-09 (2016) (sug-
gesting that spectrum of government entities, including Director of National Intelligence,
PCLOB, and FISC, should review and oversee aspects of intelligence collection).
303 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483-84
(2010) (striking down measure that imposed undue restrictions on President's power to remove
executive officers for good cause).
304 Cf Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pric-
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gaps in access can become incubators for bureaucratic abuses, under-
mining the efficacy of review. Congress could reasonably find that a
constitutionally separate entity like the FISC, with both statutory and
inherent power to obtain access and impose sanctions for abuse, is the
best guardian of the executive branch's compliance with law.
G. Limits on the FISC's Section 702 Role
Setting appropriate limits is also vital for congruency. In Morri-
son, the Supreme Court also cited limits on the D.C. Circuit's role and
that of the independent counsel, noting that judges who participated
in the appointment of the independent counsel could not then review
convictions that their appointee subsequently obtained.3°5 Analogous
limits cabin the FISC's role under section 702.
The FISC only reviews a narrow band of intelligence collection.
Its sole task under the FAA entails review of the collection of one-end
foreign communications. 3 6 It does not review collection of wholly for-
eign communications. It has no role in the adjudication of ordinary
warrant requests by federal law enforcement agencies. The FISC also
has no authority over broader national security or foreign policy is-
sues. Those limits prevent the FISC from trespassing on the preroga-
tives of the political branches. The tailored nature of the FISC's role
also preserves the distinctive capacity for judgment that Hamilton
identified as the hallmark of an independent judiciary. 30 7
CONCLUSION
The FISC's role under the FAA raises questions under Article
III. The FISC's core Article III problem is the combination of the
absence of actual adverse parties and the broad scope of the FISC's
review.3°8 Closer examination reveals that although the FISC's role
under section 702 is novel, it fits within Article III's space for the exer-
cise of judgment by independent courts.
The first step in analyzing the FISC and Article III is clarifying
that neither factor identified above-the FISC's reliance on ex parte
ing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 263-67 (1984) (discussing importance of access to information in effective
negotiations). Because an executive agency tasked with overseeing intelligence collection would
inevitably be bogged down in bureaucratic turf battles, suggestions for delegating this task to the
PCLOB may not fully address the issues at stake. But see Renan, supra note 16, at 1118-23
(arguing for increased role for PCLOB).
305 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 683 (1988).
306 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g) (2012).
307 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 8, at 464-65 (Alexander Hamilton).
308 See supra Section I.C.
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proceedings or its broad review of procedures for collecting one-end
foreign communications-poses an Article III problem on its own.30 9
Ex parte proceedings are common in federal courts; for example, war-
rant requests are typically made ex parte, and have been since the era
preceding American independence. In civil remedies such as attach-
ment, ex parte proceedings have also been common.310 In both the
warrant and attachment contexts, ex parte proceedings promoted both
secrecy and speed. By ensuring that adjudication could proceed and
facilitating wrongdoers' accountability, each remedy enhanced the
rule of law. As the Framers knew, requiring that a court issuing a war-
rant make an ex parte finding of probable cause also curbed executive
abuses reflected in the general warrants that threatened English liber-
ties in the mid-eighteenth century.
While warrants typically involve specific, concrete fact patterns,
there is no definitive constitutional objection to ex parte proceedings
involving broader review of legal issues. 311 Administrative law is re-
plete with instances of exactly this kind of broad review.312 Agency
rules attract challengers such as trade associations or nonprofit advo-
cacy groups who serve as adverse parties.313 However, these adverse
parties usually confine their arguments to issues of law. The specific
factual circumstances of such parties rarely figure in rules challenges,
which instead focus on the compliance of a regulation with statutory
norms.
Despite the absence of a definitive constitutional bar on proceed-
ings like the FISC's review of one-end foreign communications, a co-
herent analysis of the FISC's role requires an affirmative case. This
Article makes that case through the congruency test that the Supreme
Court invoked in Morrison v. Olson to determine that a statute pro-
viding for judicial appointment of an independent counsel was consis-
tent with Article III.314 Although that test was designed for the
Appointments Clause, it also fits context such as the FISC's section
702 role.
This Article builds on the wisdom in Morrison and other Su-
preme Court decisions that the test for compliance of statutes with
Article III must be pragmatic, affording Congress a measure of flexi-
309 See supra Section I.B.
310 See supra Section I.B.
311 See supra Section I.C.
312 See Vladeck, supra note 2, at 1178-79; supra Section I.C.
313 See supra Section I.C.
314 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 675-76 (1988).
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bility and deference in its exercise of Article I power. Two cases from
October Term 2015-Bank Markazi v. Peterson and Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins-demonstrate that Congress is entitled to deference when it
seeks to promote operational values such as speed and accuracy in
dynamic domains such as national security, foreign relations, and
emergent technology. 315
Congruency also looks to a statute's service to constitutional
structure. Just as judicial appointment of independent counsel in Mor-
rison guarded against conflicts of interest when the executive branch
investigated itself,316 the FISC's role under section 702 tempers the
danger of executive abuses posed by intelligence agencies' technologi-
cal reach. In reviewing government certifications that protect against
the targeting of citizens, lawful residents, and individuals within the
United States, the FISC ensures that the collection of one-end foreign
communications does not entail over-collection of purely domestic
communications. 317
Moreover, although the FISC's role is novel, it is also tethered to
Article III practice. There are possible adverse parties in FISC pro-
ceedings, including ISPs like Yahoo, which in 2008 vigorously chal-
lenged government surveillance directives. 318 Amici curiae at the FISC
can articulate opposing arguments that aid the court's deliberations.
Although a more institutionalized public advocate at the FISC would
provide even more pushback to executive branch views, competent
and vigorous amici at the FISC serve the same salutary function that
the Court in Windsor identified with the role of an amicus in the litiga-
tion challenging DOMA.319 Moreover, the U.S. individuals whose data
is incidentally collected under the FAA have experienced intrusions
that amount to the Article III touchstone of injury in fact. FISC re-
view merely compensates for the inability of these many individuals to
demonstrate standing because of the secrecy that cloaks surveillance.
Lastly, the FISC's rulings on certifications are final, addressing the
concern with mere recommendations that Supreme Court Justices first
advanced in Hayburn's Case.320
Reinforcing the case for congruency, there are no feasible alter-
natives to the FISC's FAA role. 321 Individual review of all one-end
315 See supra Section III.B.
316 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677.
317 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(c)(1), (g) (2012).
318 See supra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
319 See supra notes 268-74 and accompanying text.
320 See supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
321 See supra Section III.F.
20171
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
foreign targeting decisions would tax Article III courts' capabilities,
and might intrude on executive branch prerogatives regarding foreign
intelligence. Executive agencies and Article I courts whose judges lack
lifetime tenure lack the independence and authority to properly hold
the line against intelligence abuses.
Finally, the FISC's role under the FAA is narrow. The FISC acts
only in the contained domain of one-end foreign communications.
322 It
has no role regarding ordinary warrants, and no involvement in the
setting of national security or foreign policy beyond the review of cer-
tifications pursuant to statute.
In sum, the FISC's FAA role is a congressional response to the
risk of executive overreaching in the age of the Internet. The FISC's
role serves operational values like speed and secrecy that are vital in
an era of cyber threats. It also vindicates structural values, comparable
to those served by the independent counsel statute's response to the
problem of executive branch conflicts of interest in Morrison. The
FAA also preserves the core judicial attributes of independence and
finality. Fortified by these attributes, the FISC can guard against exec-
utive abuses without hobbling intelligence collection that is necessary
for national security. That was the driving force behind Justice Pow-
ell's invitation to Congress in Keith to create a specialized surveillance
court.323 That same impetus renders the FISC's section 702 role con-
gruent with Article III.
322 See supra Section 11I.G.
323 See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 322-24 (1972).
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